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ABSTRACT
Digital assistants embody the dream of an effortless future, free from the shackles of
yesteryear: a tool which caters to users’ needs, excels at anticipating their wants, and
delivers a personalized online environment. While digital assistants can certainly offer
great value, a closer look reveals how—in an algorithm and data–driven world—a
dominant digital assistant may ultimately serve the interests of corporations rather than
consumers. Such assistants may be used to establish a controlled and manipulated
personalized environment in which competition, welfare, privacy, and democracy give way
to corporate interests. The future is not necessarily bleak, but requires our attention if users
want the leading assistants to match the effortless dream.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

“All you need to do is say,” a 2017 article proclaimed, “‘I want a beer’
and Alexa will oblige. The future is now.” 1 Advances in technology have
seemingly increased the choices available to consumers and the
convenience of purchasing goods. As sales migrate from brick–and–mortar
shops to online sites, consumers appear to be getting more of what they
1. Matt Tate, Amazon’s New Alexa Update Means It Can Bring You Beer in Two
Hours, SHORTLIST (Mar. 21, 2017), http://www.shortlist.com/tech/gadgets/you-can-nowtell-amazons-alexa-to-bring-you-a-beer-amazon-echo.
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desire, including better prices and quality. Such a reality may initially
appear welcome and desirable. And yet, looking beyond the ease of online
shopping, the super–dominant platforms that have emerged pose several
growing threats, including algorithmic collusion, behavioral discrimination,
and anticompetitive abuses.2 Thus, a more complex reality exists.
To see why, this Article examines the developing frontier of personal
digital assistants. These helpers are being developed by the leading online
platforms: Google Assistant, Apple’s Siri, Facebook’s M, and Amazon’s
Alexa–powered Echo.3 These super–platforms are heavily investing to
improve their digital assistant offerings.4 This Article shows how network
effects, big data, and big analytics will likely undermine attempts to curtail
the digital assistant’s power, and will likely allow it to operate below the
regulatory and antitrust radar screens. As a result, rather than advancing
overall welfare, a dominant digital assistant—if left to its own devices—
can undermine our collective welfare. But the harm is not just economic.
The potential anticompetitive consequences from a dominant assistant will
likely take a toll on privacy, well–being, and democracy.
For those who grew up watching The Jetsons, the prospect of a personal
helper might seem marvelous. Many already rely on Google’s search engine
to find relevant results, Facebook to identify relevant news stories, Amazon
for book recommendations, and Siri to place phone calls, send text
messages, and find a good restaurant nearby. Many also already benefit
from basic digital assistants. Apple iPhones users may instruct Siri to call

2. See generally ARIEL EZRACHI & MAURICE E. STUCKE, VIRTUAL COMPETITION:
THE PROMISE AND PERILS OF THE ALGORITHM-DRIVEN ECONOMY (2016).
3. Alphabet Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 5 (Feb. 03, 2017) (identifying
digital assistant providers “such as Apple, Amazon, Facebook, and Microsoft” as
competitors) [hereinafter Annual Report]. We will refer to the parent holding company
Alphabet as Google. Although Microsoft competes in this arena, it announced in 2017 its
plans to allow its voice-enabled digital assistant Cortana to work with Amazon’s Alexa.
Jay Greene & Laura Stevens, Amazon’s Alexa and Microsoft’s Cortana Will Soon Be Able
to Talk to Each Other, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 30, 2017, 3:18 p.m.), https://www.wsj.com/
articles/amazons-alexa-and-microsofts-cortana-will-soon-be-able-to-talk-to-each-other1504120490. Whether this makes Microsoft a stronger or weaker competitor remains to be
seen. Finally, Samsung competes in this space as well. Laura Stevens & Tripp Mickle,
Alexa and Siri Escalate Battle of Virtual Assistants, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 1, 2017 7:09 PM),
www.wsj.com/articles/alexa-and-siri-escalate-battle-of-virtual-assistants-1504307382.
4. Solomon Israel, Why Apple, Amazon, Google and Microsoft Are All Betting on
Smart Speakers, CBC NEWS (June 12, 2017, 5:00 AM), www.cbc.ca/news/business/smartspeakers-apple-amazon-google-microsoft-1.4153237.
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their family members on speakerphone.5 Siri can “predict” what app users
might want to use, which music they would like to hear. Navigation apps
can anticipate where an individual is heading throughout the day and
provide traffic updates and time estimates.6 Even one’s favorite coffee
outlet may send a notification and prepare the loyalty card on the device
whenever consumers are near an outlet.7
Personal digital assistants are also seeking to interact with users in a
human–like way. With increasing sophistication, digital assistants promise
to transform how individuals access information, communicate, shop, are
entertained, control smart household appliances, and raise their children.8
Digital assistants will also undertake mundane tasks and free up time for
users. Amazon’s voice recognition personal assistant Alexa, for example,
can already perform many tasks. Alexa can shop (knowing everything one
previously bought through Amazon); plan one’s mornings, including
accounting for upcoming meetings, traffic, and weather; entertain one with
music; suggest movies, shows, or audiobooks; and control one’s smart
appliances at home.9 In 2016, Google showed a video of a suburban family
undergoing its morning wakeup routine: “The dad made French press coffee
while telling Google to turn on the lights and start playing music in his kids’
rooms. The mom asked if ‘my package’ had shipped. It did, Google said.
The daughter asked for help with her Spanish homework.”10 As a digital
assistant—powered by sophisticated algorithms—learns more about its
users, their routines, desires, and communications, it can excel in its role.11
5. See, e.g., Paul Horowitz, Make a Speakerphone Call with Siri from iPhone,
OSXDAILY (Aug. 1, 2015), http://osxdaily.com/2015/08/01/make-speakerphone-call-siriiphone/.
6. See, e.g., Lisa Eadicicco, Google Maps’ New Hidden Feature Could Be Very
Useful, TIME (Jan. 13, 2016, 3:24 PM), http://time.com/4178860/google-maps-newfeature/ (describing predictive features of Google Maps application).
7. Sarah Perez, Starbucks Rolls Out a More Personalized Mobile App Along with a
Revamped Rewards Program, TECHCRUNCH (Apr. 12, 2016), https://techcrunch.com/
2016/04/12/starbucks-rolls-out-a-more-personalized-mobile-app-along-with-a-revampedrewards-program/.
8. EZRACHI & STUCKE, supra note 2, at 191–202.
9. Greg Miller, Amazon Echo: The World’s Smartest Assistant, WALL ST. DAILY
(Aug. 4, 2015), http://www.wallstreetdaily.com/2015/08/04/amazon-echo-assistant/.
10. Danny Yadron, Google Assistant Takes on Amazon and Apple to be the Ultimate
Digital Butler, GUARDIAN (May 18, 2016, 2:17 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/
technology/2016/may/18/google-home-assistant-amazon-echo-apple-siri.
11. Ariel Ezrachi & Maurice Stucke, How Online Competition Affects Offline
Democracy, OXFORD BUS. LAW BLOG (Feb. 16, 2017), https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/
business-law-blog/blog/2017/02/how-online-competition-affects-offline-democracy.
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In a human–like manner, it can be funny—at just the appropriate level—
and trustworthy.12
Digital assistants can provide more than information and services; they
can anticipate a user’s needs and requests.13 After all, being privy to so
many of its users’ activities, the assistant will become their digital shadow.
As Google’s CEO noted, “[y]our phone should proactively bring up the
right documents, schedule and map your meetings, let people know if you
are late, suggest responses to messages, handle your payments and
expenses, etc.”14 The digital assistant, with its users’ trust and consent, will
likely become the key gateway to the internet.15 Because of personalization
and customization, consumers will likely relinquish other less personal and
useful interfaces, and increasingly rely on their digital assistants to
anticipate and fulfill their needs.
These technological developments promise to transform and improve
the lives of consumers, yet they come at a cost. As they occupy a critical
gatekeeper position in a multi–sided market, the assistants may not always
operate with consumer interests in mind. This reality raises challenging
questions: Despite their apparent promise, can digital assistants actually
reduce consumer welfare? Might their rise reduce the number of gateways
to the digital world, increase a few firms’ market power, and limit
competition? And if so, what are the potential social, political, and
economic concerns?
Our Article seeks to address these questions. Part II discusses the current
race among the super–platforms (Google, Apple, Facebook, and Amazon)
to control as many aspects of the online interface as possible and reap the
associated benefits. The stakes are high, given several data–driven network
effects that will likely lead to market dominance for one or two digital
assistants. What are the implications of this winner–take–all contest to be
the chief digital assistant? Part III considers the toll a dominant digital
assistant can have on competition, democracy, and privacy. Given these
risks, one would expect and hope for a “virtuous assistant”—a class of
independent assistants, developed by independent firms who treat the users’
personal interests as paramount. Part IV identifies several factors that favor
12. See, e.g., Karen Haslam, Funny Things to Ask Siri, MACWORLD (July 24, 2017),
http://www.macworld.co.uk/feature/iphone/funny-things-ask-siri-3656639/.
13. Ezrachi & Stucke, supra note 11.
14. Google CEO Pichai Sees the End of Computers as Physical Devices, ECON. TIMES
(Apr. 29, 2016, 3:58 PM), http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/tech/internet/google-ceopichai-sees-the-end-of-computers-as-physical-devices/articleshow/52040890.cms.
15. Id.
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one of the four super–platforms capturing the digital assistant market and
disfavoring the development of an independent virtuous assistant. As
market forces will not necessarily prevent and correct the harms we identify,
Part V outlines several issues and challenges confronting antitrust enforcers.
Part VI concludes.
II.

THE HIGH STAKES RACE AMONG DIGITAL
ASSISTANTS

Sales for digital assistants are accelerating, with 35.6 million people in
the United States forecasted to use a smart speaker in 2017, up 129% from
2016.16 Currently Google, Apple, and Amazon are jockeying for their
digital assistant to become consumers’ chief assistant.17 Samsung and
Microsoft are also in the race, and Facebook is expected to enter with its
assistant, “M.”18 With Amazon controlling an estimated 70% of the smart–
speaker market as of early 2017—versus 24% for Google Home19—the
stakes are great and go beyond the mere use of the digital assistant. In this
competitive race, each super–platform wants its digital assistant to become
the consumers’ primary interface—with good reason.
Default options and first–mover advantage matter in the online world.20
Digital assistants like Alexa, as this Part explores, create a positive feedback
16. Jack Nicas, Google Gives Artificial Intelligence More Power in Its Products,
WALL ST. J. (May 17, 2017, 6:59 PM), https://www.wsj.com/article_email/google-givesartificial-intelligence-more-power-in-its-products-1495050967lMyQjAxMTE3MjE0ODExNjg1Wj/. Alexa–enabled devices, Amazon reported in 2017,
“were the top-selling products across all categories on Amazon.com this holiday season.
Customers purchased and gifted a record-setting number of devices from the Amazon Echo
family with sales up over 9x compared to last holiday season.” Alexa Devices Top Amazon
Best-Seller List this Holiday – Millions of Alexa Devices Sold Worldwide, BUS. WIRE (Dec.
27, 2016, 9:00 AM), http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20161227005118/en/
Alexa-Devices-Top-Amazon-Best-Seller-List-Holiday.
17. Christopher Mims, Ask M for Help: Facebook Tests New Digital Assistant, WALL
ST. J. (Nov. 9, 2015, 12:00 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/ask-m-for-help-facebooktests-new-digital-assistant-1447045202.
18. Jessi Hempel, Facebook Launches M, Its Bold Answer to Siri and Cortana,
WIRED (Aug. 26, 2015, 1:00 PM), https://www.wired.com/2015/08/facebook-launches-mnew-kind-virtual-assistant/.
19. Jack Nicas, Google’s New Products Reflect Push into Machine Learning, WALL
ST. J. (May 18, 2016, 11:05 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/googles-new-productsreflect-push-into-machine-learning-1463598395.
20. As noted by European Competition Commissioner Margrethe Vestager, “if
Google’s apps are already on our phones when we buy them, not many of us will go to the
trouble of looking for alternatives. And that makes it hard for Google’s competitors to
persuade us to try their apps.” Margrethe Vestager, How Competition Supports Innovation
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loop from increasing levels of usage. As more people use a particular digital
assistant, the greater the demand for products and services that can connect
to that digital platform, the more likely other manufacturers and developers
will develop applications for that platform, and the more appealing the
platform becomes to consumers, manufacturers, and software developers.21
A.

NETWORK EFFECTS: WHERE THE BIG CAN GET EVEN BIGGER

“Network effects occur when the value of a product or service for a
customer increases when the number of other customers also using it
increases.”22 A telephone is a classic example. As more people have a
telephone, the more people one can call, the more use one gets from one’s
phone. Facebook’s social network and navigation apps illustrate these
network effects. While network effects may be beneficial, they may also tilt
the market in favor of a given provider or technology. The stakes are
significant with digital assistants because at least four data–driven network
effects are at play.

(May 24, 2016), https://ec.europa.eu/commission/commissioners/2014-2019/vestager/
announcements/how-competition-supports-innovation_en; see also Kenneth A.
Bamberger & Orly Lobel, Platform Market Power, 32 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. (forthcoming
2017); J. Jonas Anderson, Secret Inventions, 26 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 917, 956 (2011)
(“[F]irst-mover advantage . . . serves as an alternate means of recouping initial
investments”); Jane K. Winn, Are “Better” Security Breach Notification Laws Possible,
24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1133, 1152 n.85 (2009) (describing related conditions when first–
mover advantages are most useful); Stuart J.H. Graham, Robert P. Merges, Pam Samuelson
& Ted Sichelman, High Technology Entrepreneurs and the Patent System: Results of the
2008 Berkeley Patent Survey, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1255, 1289 (2009) (explaining that
first–mover advantage was “clearly ranked the most important” goal for patent holders in
large–scale study of patent holder motivations).
21. See, e.g., Swaroop Poudel, Internet of Things: Underlying Technologies,
Interoperability, and Threats to Privacy and Security, 31 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 997, 1010
(2016) (explaining that “[i]ndirect network effects” occur because “the more widely end
users adopt a company’s platform, the more vendors and developers are drawn to the
platform and vice versa” such that “a company that eventually owns the dominant platform
will obtain a tremendous monopoly advantage”); Rambus v. F.T.C. in the Context of
Standard-Setting Organizations, Antitrust, and the Patent Hold-Up Problem, 24
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 661, 663, 665 (2009) (describing the analogous problem of
technology lock–in as a similar anticompetitive problem).
22. Commission Decision No. M.8124 (Microsoft/LinkedIn), ¶ 341 (Dec. 6, 2016)
[hereinafter Microsoft/LinkedIn Decision], http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/
decisions/m8124_1349_5.pdf; see also United States v. Microsoft, 253 F.3d 34, 49 (D.C.
Cir. 2001).͒
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1. Attracting Manufacturers and Developers
One network effect is the positive feedback loop in attracting
manufacturers and developers.23 It will likely be inefficient for developers
to create apps, hardware, and software for every digital assistant.24 Instead
they likely will focus on the top–selling digital assistants.25 So, if more
people primarily use Amazon’s Alexa, its operating platform’s applications
and functions will likely attract more developers and smart appliance
manufacturers. Consequently, Alexa will learn more skills relative to
competitors, making it more attractive than rival digital assistants.
This feedback loop has already begun to manifest in the market. In 2015,
to increase sales of Alexa, Amazon opened its Alexa Voice Service to third–
party hardware makers, “giving them the tools to integrate Alexa into
internet-connected devices.”26 The aim was to connect Alexa to more
23. Indirect network effects arise when people increasingly use a product or
technology (for example, software platforms). See Virginia E. Scholtes, The Lexmark Test
for False Advertising Standing: When Two Prongs Don’t Make a Right, 30 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 1023, 1025 n.10, 1056 (2015). The more people that use the platform, “the more
there will be invested in developing products compatible with that platform, which, in turn
reinforces the popularity of that platform with users.” Case T-201/04, Microsoft Corp. v.
Comm’n, 2007 E.C.R. II-3601, ¶1061.
24. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d 9, 20 (D.D.C. 1999):
The fixed costs of producing software, including applications, is very
high. By contrast, marginal costs are very low. Moreover, the costs of
developing software are “sunk”—once expended to develop software,
resources so devoted cannot be used for another purpose. The result of
economies of scale and sunk costs is that application developers seek to
sell as many copies of their applications as possible. An application that
is written for one PC operating system will operate on another PC
operating system only if it is ported to that system, and porting
applications is both time-consuming and expensive. Therefore,
application developers tend to write first to the operating system with the
most users—Windows. Developers might then port their applications to
other operating systems, but only to the extent that the marginal added
sales justify the cost of porting. In order to recover that cost, ISVs that
do go to the effort of porting frequently set the price of ported
applications considerably higher than that of the original versions written
for Windows.
25. Marina Lao, Reclaiming A Role for Intent Evidence in Monopolization Analysis,
54 AM. U. L. REV. 151, 184 (2004) (“To attract users, any new OS system must support at
least all the popular software applications, but few software developers are willing to write
applications for a system that does not have a large ‘installed base,’ i.e., users.”).
26. Patrick Nixon, Bezos: Mexico Launch Is Amazon Highlight in Q2, BUS. NEWS
AM. (July 24, 2015), http://www.bnamericas.com/en/news/ict/fri-bezos-mexico-launch-isamazon-highlight-in-q2.
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“smart” appliances, like lights, fans, switches, thermostats, garage doors,
sprinklers, locks, and other devices. Amazon announced in early 2017 that
“[t]ens of thousands of developers” were using the Alexa Voice Service to
integrate Alexa into their products, including “Dish DVRs, Ford and
Volkswagen vehicles, GE C Lamp, Huawei Mate 9, LG Smart Instaview
fridge, and Whirlpool appliances.”27 Thus, as more people use Alexa, more
manufacturers will make smart–products which Alexa can control, and the
more appealing Alexa becomes to prospective purchasers and
manufacturers.
A second feedback loop occurs as developers teach the digital assistant
new skills. Amazon, for example, offers a free Alexa Skills Kit, which
“makes it fast and easy for developers to create new voice-driven
capabilities for Alexa.”28 As more people purchase Alexa, more companies
will develop new skills for Alexa. In early 2016, for example, Alexa could
directly order a pizza from Domino’s or a car from Uber, check credit card
balances with Capital One, get fitness information from Fitbit, offer election
updates from NBC News, play Jeopardy!, get stock quotes with Fidelity,
hear headlines from the Huffington Post, provide a seven–minute workout,
and test trivia knowledge with quizzes from Disney.29 Indeed, Alexa’s skills
selection tripled in three months in 2016 alone, with over “3,000 skills
available, including Food Network, GE Appliances, Yahoo Sports Fantasy
Football, and more.”30 By mid–2016, Amazon had “tens of thousands of
developers building new skills for Alexa.”31 Also in 2016 Amazon
announced “the Alexa Prize, an annual university competition with $2.5
million dedicated to accelerating the field of conversational artificial
intelligence.”32 The competition’s aim is “to build a ‘socialbot’ on Alexa

27. Amazon.com Announces Fourth Quarter Sales up 22% to $43.7 Billion, BUS.
WIRE (Feb. 02, 2017, 4:01 PM) http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20170202006
227/en/Amazon.com-Announces-Fourth-Quarter-Sales-22-43.7.
28. David Isbitski, Introducing the Alexa Skills Kit, Enabling Developers to Create
Entirely New Voice Driven Capabilities, AMAZON DEVELOPER BLOG (June 25, 2015),
https://developer.amazon.com/blogs/post/Tx205N9U1UD338H/Introducing-the-AlexaSkills-Kit-Enabling-Developers-to-Create-Entirely-New-Voic.
29. Amazon.com Announces First Quarter Sales up 28% to $29.1 Billion, BUS. WIRE
(Apr. 28, 2016, 4:01 PM), http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20160428006852/en/
Amazon.com-Announces-Quarter-Sales-28-29.1-Billion.
30. Amazon.com Announces Third Quarter Sales up 29% to $32.7 Billion, BUS. WIRE
(Oct. 27, 2017, 4:01 PM), http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20161027006743/en/
Amazon.com-Announces-Quarter-Sales-29-32.7-Billion.
31. Id.
32. Id.
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that will converse with people about popular topics and news events.”33
Thus, as more people use a particular digital assistant, more companies will
develop new skills for that digital assistant (like ordering beer and pizza),
which makes the digital assistant more appealing to prospective purchasers
and developers.
This type of network effect helped Microsoft maintain its dominance in
personal computer operating systems for decades. In United States v.
Microsoft Corp., the government argued that network effects acted as
structural barriers for those seeking to enter the market for Intel–compatible
personal computer operating systems.34 The U.S. Court of Appeals agreed,
and held that an “applications barrier to entry” protected Microsoft’s
dominance.35 That barrier resulted because “(1) most consumers prefer
operating systems for which a large number of applications have already
been written; and (2) most developers prefer to write for operating systems
that already have a substantial consumer base.”36 This “chicken-and-egg”
situation “ensures that applications will continue to be written for the
already dominant Windows, which in turn ensures that consumers will
continue to prefer it over other operating systems.”37 The court also noted
that this applications barrier to entry led consumers to prefer the dominant
operating system, even if they did not need all the available applications:
The consumer wants an operating system that runs not only types
of applications that he knows he will want to use, but also those
types in which he might develop an interest later. Also, the
consumer knows that if he chooses an operating system with
enough demand to support multiple applications in each product
category, he will be less likely to find himself straitened later by
having to use an application whose features disappoint him.
Finally, the average user knows that, generally speaking,
applications improve through successive versions. He thus wants
an operating system for which successive generations of his
favorite applications will be released—promptly at that. The fact
that a vastly larger number of applications are written for
Windows than for other PC operating systems attracts consumers

33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

Id.
United States v. Microsoft, 253 F.3d 34, 49–50, 55 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
Id. at 55.
Id.
Id.
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to Windows, because it reassures them that their interests will be
met as long as they use Microsoft’s product.38

This network effect also helped solidify Google’s and Apple’s dominance
over the mobile phone operating system.39
2. Learning–by–Doing
Besides this traditional network effect, an additional network effect
involves learning–by–doing. Search engines demonstrate this data–driven
network effect clearly.40 Each person’s utility from using the search engine
increases when others use it as well.41 As more people use the search engine,
the more likely the search engine can learn consumers’ preferences, the
more relevant the search results will likely be, which in turn will likely
attract others to use the search engine; and the positive feedback
continues.42 Interestingly with this network effect, as more people use the
service or product, its quality improves.43
This learning–by–doing network effect has multiple applications with
digital assistants. One is voice recognition. The more people talk to the
assistant, the better able the assistant can learn the different pronunciations,
sentence structures, and different ways commands can be made.44 As the
algorithm’s skill improves in understanding what people want, developers
do not have to code for every variation.45 As Microsoft states, “[w]hether

38. Id.
39. Jonathan Sallet, The Creation of Value: The Value Circle and Evolving Market
Structures, 11 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 185, 234 (2013).
40. MAURICE E. STUCKE & ALLEN P. GRUNES, BIG DATA AND COMPETITION POLICY
172–81 (1st ed. 2016); Press Release, European Comm’n, Antitrust: Commission Fines
Google €2.42 Billion for Abusing Dominance as Search Engine by Giving Illegal
Advantage to Own Comparison Shopping Service (June 27, 2017), http://europa.eu/rapid/
press-release_MEMO-17-1785_en.htm [hereinafter EC Fact Sheet] (discussing high
barriers to entry in these markets, in part because of network effects: “the data a search
engine gathers about consumers can in turn be used to improve results”).
41. STUCKE & GRUNES, supra note 40, at 170–81.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Cortana Dev Center, MICROSOFT, https://developer.microsoft.com/en-us/Cortana
(last visited Oct. 24, 2017).
45. This process is called machine learning. See, e.g., id.; Christian Chessman, A
“Source” of Error: Computer Code, Criminal Defendants, and the Constitution, 105
CALIF. L. REV. 179, 181 n.9 (2017) (explaining that machine learning involves combining
“rules of analysis” and “repeated exposure to data patterns” in order to iteratively modify
software “output or behaviors” over time); M. I. Jordan & T. M. Mitchell, Machine
Learning: Trends, Perspectives, and Prospects, 349 SCIENCE 255, 255 (2015) (“Machine
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someone says ‘I need a taxi’ or ‘call me a cab,’” its digital assistant Cortana
“gets it.”46
A second application occurs when the digital assistant learns relevant
responses. For example, one 2017 study compared how Google’s and
Amazon’s digital assistants understood and responded to 800 queries.47
Both assistants understood approximately 94% of the queries.48 What is
remarkable is that their ability to answer correctly improved significantly
between February and August 2017: from approximately 34% to 54% for
Amazon and from 39% to 65% for Google.49 As one reviewer in early 2016
noted, “[w]ith a rapidly growing slate of features, integrations and use cases,
it’s easy to get excited about the Echo’s potential. . . . More than two years
after its debut, the smarter-than-ever Amazon remains one of the best
connected home products money can currently buy.”50 Over the next few
years, as more skills are developed, more features are added, and more trial–
and–error learning occurs,51 digital assistants will be even smarter and in
many more homes.52

learning addresses the question of how to build computers that improve automatically
through experience.”).
46. MICROSOFT, supra note 44; Harry Shum, Microsoft AI, MICROSOFT,
https://wuncontentservice.blob.core.windows.net/berlin-cms/2017/09/Microsoft-AIAmplifying-human-ingenuity.pdf (last visited Oct. 24, 2017).
47. Gene Munster, Faceoff: Amazon Echo Show vs Google Home Part II, LOUP
VENTURES (Aug. 11, 2017), http://loupventures.com/faceoff-amazon-echo-show-vsgoogle-home-part-ii/.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Ry Crist & David Carnoy, Amazon Echo Review: The Smart Speaker That Can
Control Your Whole House, CNET (July 18, 2017), https://www.cnet.com/products/
amazon-echo-review/.
51. See infra Part IV (describing digital assistant learning process).
52. Jim Marous, Banking Needs An ‘Amazon Prime’ Marketing Strategy, FIN. BRAND
(July 27, 2017), https://thefinancialbrand.com/66545/amazon-prime-digital-bankingloyalty-experience-strategy/; Mary Branscombe, Making Cortana Smarter: How Machine
Learning Is Becoming More Dynamic, TECHRADAR (Mar. 19, 2015), www.techradar.com/
news/world-of-tech/making-cortana-smarter-how-machine-learning-is-becoming-moredynamic-1287936; Google Assistant to Take Over Apple Siri, Amazon Alexa, and Samsung
Bixby by 2021: Report, BGR (Sept. 4, 2017, 2:31 PM), http://www.bgr.in/news/googleassistant-to-take-over-apple-siri-amazon-alexa-and-samsung-bixby-by-2021-report/;
Stephen Shankland, How Apple Uses AI To Make Siri Sound More Human, CNET (Aug.
23, 2017, 3:17 PM), https://www.cnet.com/news/apple-ai-machine-learning-makes-sirisound-human-on-ios-11/.
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3. Scope of Data
A third data–driven network effect involves the scope of personal data
collected, which can be used to personalize tasks and predict individualized
user needs. The super–platforms already expend significant effort to better
track individuals, collect their personal data, and profile them. 53 So the
feedback loop adds another dimension: digital assistants no longer merely
rely on aggregated insights from the earlier queries of other users, but
instead include an additional layer of insight in predicting individual tastes
and preferences by using the variety of personal data the super–platform
collects about its users.
In other words, the more one uses a digital assistant, and the more
personal data it collects, the more opportunities the digital assistant can
anticipate one’s particular needs. Super–platforms already expressly
recognize this fact; as Microsoft noted, “[w]ith a user’s permission, Cortana
can deliver unique, personal experiences based on her knowledge of user
preferences: everything from their favorite food to the location of their next
meeting.”54 The scope of the personal data—“what app you are in, previous
search history, your current GPS, as well as personal details”—can also
provide the needed context for its user’s voice inquiry or in anticipating the
user’s requests.55
As the digital assistant seamlessly converses with users, it can also
recognize the household’s different voices. So if the mother of a large
family asks, “Okay Google, what’s on my calendar today?” the digital
assistant can identify the speaker.
4. Spill–Over Effects
Because the personal assistant is ostensibly “free” to use, its provider
has to monetize its services. One way is through personal data, which it can
sell. Or the platform can monetize through advertising and fees from sellers.
Here network effects on the “free” (consumer) side can spill over to the
“paid” (provider) side, and each side can reinforce the other. As more users
with heterogeneous requests are attracted to the digital assistant, a greater
variety of advertisers and sellers will migrate to the digital assistant’s
platform as well.

53. EZRACHI & STUCKE, supra note 2, at chs. 15, 16.
54. MICROSOFT, supra note 44.
55. Tich Savanhu, Leveraging the Rise of Voice Search, BIZCOMMUNITY (Apr. 4,
2017), http://www.bizcommunity.com/Article/196/179/160034.html.
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As discussed above, growth in user base for a particular personal
assistant will likely drive more companies to develop skills and applications
for that assistant.56 The more consumers rely on a particular digital assistant,
the more sellers will be attracted to that platform. The super–platform’s
power accordingly increases, including the fees it can collect from sellers
to transact with its digital assistant’s users.57 (Amazon, for example, earns
fees from third–party sellers that sell on its platform.58) A dominant
platform can also use the inflow of personal data to better target consumers
with its own and third–party products and services.
The more personal data the platform collects, the better the platform can
target users with personalized sponsored search results and ads.59 Platforms
compete for advertisers based on the return on investment that the platform
can deliver.60 Some of the super–platforms, like Google, earn most of their
revenues from advertising.61 When consumers click on a relevant sponsored
ad (which generates revenue on a cost–per–click basis) or see a display ad
(which generates revenue on a cost–per–impression basis), Google gets
paid.62 As more users are drawn to the digital assistant and the super–
platform’s other free services, the super–platform amasses a greater variety
of data to effectively target consumers with relevant ads, products, and

56. See supra notes 21–24 and accompanying text.
57. EC Fact Sheet, supra note 40 (discussing how “the more consumers use a search
engine, the more attractive it becomes to advertisers” and the “profits generated can then
be used to attract even more consumers”).
58. See Alistair Barr, Amazon’s Sellers Are Furious Over the Website’s Fees,
HUFFINGTON POST (May 18, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/03/18/amazonsellers_n_2899568.html.
59. Julia Angwin, Surya Mattu & Terry Parris Jr., Facebook Doesn’t Tell Users
Everything It Really Knows About Them, PROPUBLICA (Dec. 27, 2016, 9:00 AM),
https://www.propublica.org/article/facebook-doesnt-tell-users-everything-it-reallyknows-about-them; Julia Angwin, Madeleine Varner & Ariana Tobin, Facebook Enabled
Advertisers to Reach ‘Jew Haters’, PROPUBLICA (Sept. 14, 2017, 4:00 PM),
https://www.propublica.org/article/facebook-enabled-advertisers-to-reach-jew-haters;
Alex Kantrowitz, Google Allowed Advertisers to Target People Searching Racist Phrases,
BUZZFEED NEWS (Sept. 15, 2017, 11:15 AM), www.buzzfeed.com/alexkantrowitz/googleallowed-advertisers-to-target-jewish-parasite-black .
60. Barr, supra note 58; United States v. Bazaarvoice, Inc., No. 13-CV-00133-WHO,
2014 WL 203966, at *21 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 8, 2014) (“A critical asset in building a successful
social commerce network is to have the largest audience possible because that is how
advertisers and marketers and brands think about the value they get.”) (internal quotations
omitted).
61. STUCKE & GRUNES, supra note 40, at 196–97.
62. Id.

2017]

DIGITAL ASSISTANTS

1253

services.63 The more time users spend on the platform’s services (such as
search engines, email, maps, videos, etc.), the more opportunities the
platform can target users in the moments that matter for a purchasing
decision, and the more ad revenues it attracts relative to other online sites.
This network effect is already at play in online markets; in the first quarter
of 2016, for example, it was estimated that “85 cents of every new dollar
spent in online advertising” went to Google or Facebook.64
Digital assistants are already deploying ads and are likely to continue
doing so in the future. In 2017, users of Google’s digital assistant received
an ad for the movie “Beauty and the Beast” even when they simply asked,
“OK Google, what’s my day like?”65 (Google denied calling it a
commercial; instead it wanted to “call out timely content.”66) Amazon is
currently testing ads with its digital assistant, and ads are expected to
increase.67 But the ad may not always appear through the digital assistant.
A user might ask Google Home about good hotels in Palm Beach, and an
advertisement for the Ritz Carlton might appear across its expanding
platform of “free” services (such as sponsored search results, ads in emails,
and display ads in videos). The ad might also appear across media (such as
personal computers, smartphones, tablets, and soon, “smart” household
appliances and driverless cars).68
Ultimately, as more people use a particular digital assistant, the more
skills the assistant acquires, the better the assistant becomes in recognizing
commands and faces, the better the assistant becomes in anticipating users’
needs and responding to their requests. The platform, in turn, becomes more
attractive to sellers and advertisers who want to target these users, which
63. Id.
64. John Herrman, Media Websites Battle Faltering Ad Revenue and Traffic, N.Y.
TIMES (Apr. 17, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/18/business/media-websitesbattle-falteringad-revenue-and-traffic.html.
65. Ben Fox Rubin, Ads for Voice Assistants Are Here and They’re Already Terrible,
CNET (Apr. 21, 2017, 5:00 AM), https://www.cnet.com/news/ads-voice-assistantsamazon-alexa-google-home-burger-king/.
66. Id.
67. Nicholas Shields, Get Ready for Ads on Alexa, BUS. INSIDER (May 15, 2017, 9:33
AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/amazon-trials-voice-assistant-ads-2017-5.
68. Victor Luckerson, Google Wants to Put Ads in Your Refrigerator, TIME (May 21,
2014, 12:53 PM), http://time.com/107593/google-ads-nest-refrigerator-internet-of-things/
(noting Google’s expectation “that users will be using [its] services and viewing [its] ads
on an increasingly wide diversity of devices in the future, and thus [its] advertising systems
are becoming increasingly device-agnostic”); see also Lothar Determann & Bruce Perens,
Open Cars, 32 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 913, 918–19 (2017) (describing “behavioral data”
that smart car developers “can monetize for advertising and other purposes”).

1254

BERKELEY TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 32:1239

generates more revenue for the platform to connect its assistant with other
technologies and ostensibly “free” services.
B.

HOW THE NETWORK EFFECTS INCREASE THE COMPETITIVE STAKES

Firms compete to dominate markets characterized by network effects.69
As one product or standard increases in popularity, it trends toward
dominance. The big get bigger, until they dominate the industry.70 As one
U.S. court observed, “once dominance is achieved, threats come largely
from outside the dominated market, because the degree of dominance of
such a market tends to become so extreme.”71 At that stage, the benefits
from network effects may be dwarfed by the impact on competition and
innovation.
Digital assistants are starting to exhibit these network effects. By July
2017, for example, Amazon’s Alexa acquired over 15,000 skills—up from
its 10,000 skills in February 2017, which was triple what it had in September
2016.72 By mid–2017, Google in contrast had 378 skills, while Microsoft
had only 65 skills.73 To avoid falling behind, Google is partnering with
Walmart Stores Inc. whereby users of Google Express shopping service can
easily order from the retail giant using Google’s virtual assistant.74
As the digital economy shifts from a mobile–dominated world to an AI–
dominated platform, the leading platforms’ plans are clear: they “envision
a future where humans do less thinking when it comes to the small decisions
that make up daily life.”75 That increased reliance on the digital assistant is
the Holy Grail for the super–platforms. Their aim is to increase the time
users spend on their platform—on the gate which they control—which in
turn delivers income from advertisements, referrals, and purchasing
activities.
The key is to control as many aspects of the online interface and reap
the associated benefits. As Google CEO Sundar Pichai wrote shareholders
in 2016, “[t]he next big step will be for the very concept of the ‘device’ to
fade away. Over time, the computer itself—whatever its form factor—will
69. Poudel, supra note 21, at 1010.
70. Id.
71. Novell, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 505 F.3d 302, 308 (4th Cir. 2007).
72. Sarah Perez, Amazon’s Alexa Passes 15,000 Skills, Up From 10,000 in February,
TECHCRUNCH (July 3, 2017), https://techcrunch.com/2017/07/03/amazons-alexa-passes15000-skills-up-from-10000-in-february/.
73. Id.
74. Stevens & Mickle, supra note 3.
75. Yadron, supra note 10.
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be an intelligent assistant helping you through your day.”76 Google, for
example, announced in 2017 that its Assistant “will soon be available via
an app on iPhones . . . as well as a variety of other devices, including
refrigerators, washing machines and toys,” following a similar move by
Amazon.77 In discussing its digital assistant, Google’s CEO said, “We want
users to have an ongoing two-way dialogue with Google.”78 Google is not
alone in that sentiment; “Alexa may be Amazon’s most loved invention yet
— literally — with over 250,000 marriage proposals from customers and
counting,” said Jeff Bezos, Amazon’s founder and CEO. “And she’s just
getting better. Because Alexa’s brain is in the cloud, we can easily and
continuously add to her capabilities and make her more useful — wait until
you see some of the surprises the team is working on now.”79
As consumers spend more time conversing primarily with their digital
assistant, who will increasingly predict and fulfill their needs, they will less
frequently search the web, look at price–comparison websites, or download
apps. Google’s search engine used “to show just ten blue links in [its]
results, which you had to click through to find your answers.”80 Now
Google is “increasingly able to provide direct answers—even if you’re
speaking your question using Voice Search—which makes it quicker, easier
and more natural to find what you’re looking for.”81 Rather than searching
online for information, you can now talk with Google Assistant “in a natural
conversational way to help you get things done.”82 Thus, Google Assistant
forms part of the company’s “effort to further entrench itself in users’ daily
lives by answering users’ queries directly rather than pointing them to other
sources.”83
The more a user converses with and delegates to the digital assistant, the
better it can predict the user’s tastes, and the more likely consumers
generally will rely on it for daily activities. As the digital assistant
accumulates information over time, the switching costs (and quality gap)
76. Jay Greene, Microsoft, Other Tech Giants Race to Develop Machine Intelligence,
WALL ST. J. (June 14, 2016, 6:58 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/tech-giants-race-todevelop-machine-intelligence-1465941959.
77. Nicas, supra note 16.
78. Jack Nicas, Google Makes Push into Artificial Intelligence with New Offerings,
WALL ST. J. (May 18, 2016, 3:58 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/google-makes-pushinto-artificial-intelligence-with-new-offerings-1463595169.
79. Id.
80. Annual Report, supra note 3.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Nicas, supra note 19.
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between digital assistants will become higher.84 One could therefore be
willingly locked into one’s comfort zone. Illustrative are efforts by
Facebook, which in 2015 announced a beta version of its digital assistant:
M.85 M can replace most web searches and apps with a function within
Facebook Messenger.86 As the next Part discusses, the removal of the
human element from the search activity, and partly from the decision–
making, transfers more power to the platform. The digital assistant will use
its own tools and may exercise its own judgment (or the judgment of the
super–platform) as to prioritizing and communicating the results. When it
does so, it will not likely have its users’ interests in mind.
III.

IMPLICATIONS OF THIS WINNER–TAKE–ALL CONTEST
TO BE THE CHIEF DIGITAL ASSISTANT

If firms compete to dominate markets characterized by network effects,
what are the implications if one or two digital assistants control the market?
As this Part explores, a dominant digital assistant may abuse its gatekeeper
position in three ways. First, such a digital assistant can lessen competition,
to the detriment of sellers upstream and consumers downstream. Second, it
poses significant risks to democracy and the marketplace of ideas. Third, it
may take a significant toll on privacy and personal peace of mind.
A.

ECONOMIC CONCERNS

A dominant digital assistant raises several economic concerns. As
illustrated earlier, Google and other super–platforms have the goal of
increasingly providing direct answers—through voice queries—which
makes it quicker, easier, and more natural to find results. Rather than
searching online for information, users will talk with Google Assistant,
Alexa, or another digital assistant in a natural and conversational way. By
controlling the interface between the user and sellers or advertisers, the
companies controlling the dominant digital assistants can abuse their
significant market power, adversely affecting both sellers upstream and
users downstream.

84. See, e.g., Sharon D. Nelson & John W. Simek, Are Alexa and Her Friends Safe
for Office Use?, LAW PRAC., September/October 2017, at 27 (“Unfortunately, Amazon
uses all of the history to make Alexa ‘smarter’ by learning what you ask for and how you
ask it. If you delete all the voice history, Alexa will effectively revert back to a new factory
setting. That's the tradeoff between privacy and usability. Maintaining your privacy means
less usability.”).
85. Mims, supra note 17.
86. Id.
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1. Upstream Anticompetitive Effects
Consider the following question: who pays the digital assistant?
Consumers pay for the hardware, such as for the iPhone to access Siri. But
none of the super–platforms charge a monthly fee for using their digital
assistants. Once a consumer buys Amazon’s Echo, she can access Alexa
without additional charges. This initially appears to be extraordinary: each
super–platform encourages users to heap as many tasks as possible on its
free digital assistant. To contextualize both the invasiveness and magnitude
of these digital assistants, consider their analogue: if a company offered you
a human assistant, upon whom you could heap as many tasks as possible,
without incurring any charge, would you accept the offer? Would you trust
them with your intimate information, or to observe you in your home?
Would you be confident in that assistant to ultimately promote your
interests or the company’s?
The issue concerns the true employers/principals of these digital
assistants. On a superficial level, the digital assistants directly serve users.
The digital assistant will dim the lights upon command and change the
temperature as needed. But this new trusted alter ego, to whom individuals
outsource their decision–making is also partial. After all, being the
ostensibly “free” part of a multi–sided market, users do not directly pay for
the digital assistant’s services. The digital assistant ultimately must cater to
the needs of its real employer—the platform. Of course, consumers can still
benefit when the platform’s interests are aligned with the interests of its
users. But individuals may often be unaware of when such alignment is
absent.
As more customers rely on the digital assistant for purchases,
entertainment, news, services, and information, the more attractive the
platform becomes to sellers. Sellers know that the inclusion of their
products and services on a platform’s search results may be crucial for
commercial visibility. As these “information and referral junctions” become
a crucial gatekeeper between suppliers and consumers, the platform’s
bargaining power and ability to distort competition upstream increase.87

87. See, e.g., Ioannis Lianos & Evgenia Motchenkova, Market Dominance and
Search Quality in the Search Engine Market, 9 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 419, 422 (2013)
(“Search engines act as ‘information gatekeepers’: they not only provide information on
what can be found on the web (equivalent to yellow pages), but they also are ‘an essential
first-point-of-call for anyone venturing onto the Internet’” and how search engines differ
from other two-sided platforms, as they “detain an important amount of information about
their customers and advertisers (the ‘map of commerce’).”).
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The gatekeeper may charge, like powerful price comparison websites,
an entrance fee (commission) from sellers for the right to be featured in the
digital assistant’s options. Some platforms, for instance, allow for
preferential placement based on the level of payment or commission they
receive from sellers. For instance, pay–for–placement fees allow a platform
to charge higher rates to sellers for the right to be positioned at the top of
the list on the default page result. Such positioning may distort competition
when the user is unaware of the preferential positioning and assumes that
the top results are the best (or most relevant) ones objectively picked by the
website’s algorithms. One example of such manipulation of results is in
online air and hotel bookings.88 Following Expedia’s 2015 acquisition of
Orbitz, for example, “the online travel agency implemented a new program
that enables hotel properties to move to the first page of Expedia’s listings
for an additional 10 percent commission.” 89 Another example is gas and
electricity aggregators.90 Such aggregators may also delist sellers which are

88. See, e.g., US Airways, Inc. v. Sabre Holdings Corp., No. 11 CIV. 2725 (LGS),
2017 WL 1064709, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 21, 2017) (“Ultimately, US Airways had no
choice but to accept them in the US Airways-Sabre 2006 contract for fear of being removed
from the Sabre GDS or being retaliated against, for example, through ‘display biasing,’
which means reordering search results as they appear in the system to disadvantage a
particular airline.”). Several factors can influence how hotel booking intermediaries order
hotels, including “customer ratings and complaints”; “if hotels are willing to pay larger
commissions”; “photo quality”; and “if a hotel is quicker to turn shoppers into buyers.”
Scott McCartney, How Booking Sites Influence Which Hotels You Pick, WALL ST. J. (Jan.
27, 2016), http://www.wsj.com/articles/how-booking-sites-influence-which-hotels-youpick-1453921300. Some hotels have criticized how these intermediaries tailor their search
results. The American Hotel & Lodging Association told the Wall Street Journal, “[b]iased
or misleading search results from these sites or via web searches can be highly problematic,
particularly on those booking websites that purport to be helping consumers comparison
shop based off of less than objective information.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
89. Vista/Cvent: High Combined Market Share and Entry Barriers in Strategic
Meeting Management Could Create Hurdle to Clearance; Increased DOJ Interest in Data
Privacy May Drive Additional Scrutiny, CAPITOL FORUM (July 20, 2016),
http://createsend.com/t/j-2C8274378D0F467C.
90. Rachel Rickard Straus, Price Comparison Website Bosses Under Attack From
MPs for Not Showing Customers the Best Deals, THIS IS MONEY (Feb. 4, 2014, 6:44 AM),
http://www.thisismoney.co.uk/money/bills/article-2939364/Price-comparison-websitebosses-attack-MPs.html (“The executives at uSwitch, MoneySupermarket, Compare the
Market, Confused.com and Go Compare were hauled in front of the MPs after it was
claimed . . . that some were ‘hiding’ the best gas and electricity deals from their
customers.”). Among other things, platforms were accused of “not showing the cheapest
tariffs by default if it meant they wouldn’t earn a commission.” Id.

2017]

DIGITAL ASSISTANTS

1259

disruptive to the platform’s operation (or advertising–driven business
model).91
Such strategy may further intensify in markets in which the gatekeeper
is vertically integrated. For instance, the platform could insist that sellers
and buyers use its payment system or other related products.92 Such
integration might enable the gatekeeper to leverage its power to related
markets, pushing out independent operators.
Google showed how a powerful intermediary could abuse its market
power upstream. Google’s search engine is dominant.93 In 2017, the
European Commission fined Google a record amount (€2.42 billion) for
abusing its dominant position in searches.94 As the Commission noted,
Google’s search engine “provides search results to consumers, who pay for
the service with their data.”95 In 2004 Google entered a separate market,
namely comparison shopping. One problem for Google was that the
comparison shopping market already had several established players;
another problem was that Google’s product (Froogle) was subpar.96 But
comparison shopping services relied to a large extent on traffic to be
competitive.97 Moreover, the comparison shopping service market has its
own network effects: as more customers use that comparison shopping site,
the more likely retailers will want to list their products with that comparison
shopping service. To improve its position on the market for comparison
shopping, Google used its dominant search engine to redirect traffic. From
2008, Google began pushing its own comparison shopping service, while

91. EZRACHI & STUCKE, supra note 2, at 179–86.
92. See, e.g., Kathleen De Vere, Google Tweaks Policy, All Google Play Apps Must
Use Google’s Payment System, ADWEEK (July 31, 2012), http://www.adweek.com/digital/
google-drops-the-hammer-on-third-party-android-billing-services-apps-must-usegoogles-billing-system/.
93. Search Engine Market Share Worldwide, STATCOUNTER, http://gs.statcounter.
com/search-engine-market-share/all/worldwide/2016 (last visited Oct. 24, 2017) (noting
that Google possessed 91.84% search engine market share worldwide in 2016); Press
Release, European Comm’n, Antitrust: Commission Fines Google €2.42 Billion for
Abusing Dominance as Search Engine by Giving Illegal Advantage to Own Comparison
Shopping Service (June 27, 2017), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-1784
_en.htm.
94. Press Release, supra note 93.
95. Id.
96. Id. (“Contemporary evidence from Google shows that the company was aware
that Froogle’s market performance was relatively poor (one internal document from 2006
stated ‘Froogle simply doesn’t work’).”).
97. Id. (“More traffic leads to more clicks and generates revenue.”).
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relegating the rival (and superior) comparison shopping services.98 Most
people click on the first few results provided by Google’s search engine.99
Few people go to the second page, and even fewer go to the third page of
results.100 Google systematically placed its own comparison shopping
service on the first page at or near the top of the search results.101 Google
relegated the rival shopping services to later pages—the better ones only
appeared on page four of Google’s search results, and others appeared even
further down the list.102
As a result of its illegal practices, Google effectively increased the
traffic to its own comparison shopping service, while drying up the traffic
to its rivals’ services.103 As the Commission noted:
Since the beginning of each abuse, Google’s comparison shopping
service has increased its traffic 45-fold in the United Kingdom,
35-fold in Germany, 19-fold in France, 29-fold in the Netherlands,
17-fold in Spain and 14-fold in Italy. Following the demotions
applied by Google, traffic to rival comparison shopping services
on the other hand dropped significantly. For example, the
Commission found specific evidence of sudden drops of traffic to
certain rival websites of 85% in the United Kingdom, up to 92%
in Germany and 80% in France. These sudden drops could also
not be explained by other factors. Some competitors have adapted
and managed to recover some traffic but never in full.104

It is remarkable how effectively Google stifled competition in the
comparison shopping market. Even though Google was intentionally
degrading the quality of its search results, few consumers, if any, switched
to other search engines, such as Yahoo! or Bing.105 Even though competitors
were a click away, competition was not. Moreover, users could have
scrolled to the fourth page of Google’s search results, but few did. For
search results on personal computers:
[T]he ten highest-ranking generic search results on page 1 together
generally receive approximately 95% of all clicks on generic
search results (with the top search result receiving about 35% of
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (noting Google’s consistently high market share for search in the EU).
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all the clicks). The first result on page 2 of Google’s search results
receives only about 1% of all clicks. The effects on mobile devices
are even more pronounced given the much smaller screen size.106

In what consumers often view as a neutral environment, the ability to switch
did not match the incentive to do so. Google effectively increased the
friction for consumers to use rival shopping services, while reducing the
friction for its own (subpar) product.107
The anticompetitive effects of search degradation will be likelier and
more severe with a dominant digital assistant. For one thing, with the
Google Shopping case the issue was whether the rivals’ services were on
the first, fourth, or subsequent pages of Google’s results.108 In contrast,
digital assistants will not provide several pages of results. As they promise
to become “more conversational,”109 digital assistants will likely offer one
or two suggestions. If many consumers—whether on their PCs or mobile
phones—did not look at the second or third page of the search engine’s
results, users will likely hear even fewer suggestions from their digital
assistant. Moreover, if many users did not “multi–home” by running the
same search query on multiple search engines, they are less likely to multi–
home by searching independently online. Instead, they will likely rely on
their assistant’s one or two suggestions.
For example, one 2017 study sought to better understand how Amazon’s
digital assistant recommends items. Over 450 products—in health care,
beauty, household cleaning, electronics, and grocery categories—were
ordered, and “an overwhelming number of products Alexa suggested tended

106. EC Fact Sheet, supra note 40; see also ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV.,
ALGORITHMS AND COLLUSION - NOTE FROM THE UNITED KINGDOM 5 (2017), https://one.
oecd.org/document/DAF/COMP/WD(2017)19/en/pdf [hereinafter UK SUBMISSION]
(“[H]igh ranking and prominent visibility in search results (whether organic or nonorganic) may be important to a business’ ability to compete effectively; and this is partly
due to consumers’ online search behaviours, in particular their propensity to focus their
attention, clicks and purchases on links at the top of returned search results and rarely
venture beyond the first results page.”).
107. Press Release, supra note 93.
108. EC Fact Sheet, supra note 40 (“Real-world consumer behaviour, surveys and eyetracking studies demonstrate that consumers generally click far more on search results at
or near the top of the first search results page than on results lower down the first page, or
on subsequent pages, where rival comparison shopping services were most often found
after demotion.”).
109. Frederic Lardinois, The Google Assistant Is Getting More Conversational,
TECHCRUNCH (May 17, 2017), https://techcrunch.com/2017/05/17/the-google-assistantis-getting-more-conversational/.
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to be those available to Prime members” and “products with Amazon
Choice designation, which is given to the top brand in each product group,
were far more likely to be recommended for first-time orders.”110 Thus
Alexa did not provide a panoply of products, but recommended ones
Amazon specifically designated. And Amazon will not necessarily offer the
cheapest or best value product. ProPublica, for example:
looked at 250 frequently purchased products over several weeks
to see which ones were selected for the most prominent placement
on Amazon’s virtual shelves — the so-called ‘buy box’ that pops
up first as a suggested purchase. About three-quarters of the time,
Amazon placed its own products and those of companies that pay
for its services in that position even when there were substantially
cheaper offers available from others. That turns out to be an
important edge. Most Amazon shoppers end up clicking “add to
cart” for the offer highlighted in the buy box.111

Thus, companies may pay Amazon for this “Choice designation.”112 Or
Amazon may simply have its assistant promote its own products.113
Another reason why search bias will be likelier and more effective with
digital assistants is that it will be harder to detect. In the Google Shopping
case, the Commission had a ready counterfactual: namely how the results
would have looked if Google’s own comparison shopping service were
subject to Google’s own generic search algorithm.114 Absent Google’s
manipulation of the search results, its generic algorithm presumably would
have given greater prominence to other shopping services. For example, a
rival service might have been on the first page, while Google’s shopping
service appeared on the fourth page. Thus, the Commission ordered equal
treatment, namely that “Google has to apply the same processes and
methods to position and display rival comparison shopping services in

110. Marty Swant, Alexa Is More Likely to Recommend Amazon Prime Products,
According to New Research, ADWEEK (July 7, 2017), http://www.adweek.com/digital/
alexa-is-more-likely-to-recommend-amazon-prime-products-according-to-new-research/.
111. Julia Angwin & Surya Mattu, Amazon Says It Puts Customers First. But Its
Pricing Algorithm Doesn’t, PROPUBLICA (Sept. 20, 2016, 8:00 AM), www.propublica.org/
article/amazon-says-it-puts-customers-first-but-its-pricing-algorithm-doesnt.
112. OLIVIA LAVECCHIA & STACY MITCHELL, AMAZON’S STRANGLEHOLD: HOW THE
COMPANY’S TIGHTENING GRIP IS STIFLING COMPETITION, ERODING JOBS, AND
THREATENING COMMUNITIES 20–21 (2016), https://ilsr.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/
ILSR_AmazonReport_final.pdf.
113. Id. at 24–25.
114. Press Release, supra note 93.
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Google's search results pages as it gives to its own comparison shopping
service.”115
With digital assistants, the antitrust agency may lack a ready
counterfactual, as there might not be a generic search algorithm. Instead,
the digital assistant, using the consumer’s personal data, personalizes results
for that person’s tastes. Google Assistant, for example, can utilize users’
search history and customize its responses based on what it knows about the
users’ queries.116 So when you ask your Assistant, “What movie do you
recommend?,” your results will likely differ from your neighbor’s. Thus, it
will be harder for the competition authority to reconstruct what the digital
assistant would have recommended, but for the search degradation.117
A third reason why search bias will be likelier and more effective with
dominant digital assistants is their omnipresence. In the Shopping case,
Google could lessen competition even though users could download apps
of competing services (or change their default search engine). When many
users rely on a dominant digital assistant, it will be harder for the disfavored
seller to reach the user. Even when a disfavored seller can gain a user’s
attention, the digital assistant may interject with its own recommendation,
suggesting a special deal by a member of its platform’s ecosystem. In this
multi–sided market, the digital assistant may subtly push certain products
and services and degrade or conceal others, all in the name of
personalization. Rather than deter such abuses, market forces, given the
data–driven network effects, can actually increase entry barriers.118
2. Downstream Anticompetitive Effects
Competition officials are familiar with price discrimination, where
different consumers are charged different prices, depending on their
willingness and ability to pay. Digital assistants can help facilitate

115. EC Fact Sheet, supra note 40.
116. Virtual Assistant Comparison: Cortana, Google Assistant, Siri, Alexa, Bixby, DIG.
TRENDS (Aug. 29, 2017, 8:44 AM), https://www.digitaltrends.com/computing/cortana-vssiri-vs-google-now/.
117. Not So Froogle: The European Commission Levies a Huge Fine on Google,
ECONOMIST (July 1, 2017), https://www.economist.com/news/business/21724436-itscase-not-perfect-it-asks-right-questions-european-commission-levies-huge (“If search
algorithms become more personalised, as is expected to be the case with digital assistants
such as Amazon’s Alexa, it will be even more difficult to detect bias.”).
118. EC Fact Sheet, supra note 40 (discussing how network effects increase entry
barriers).
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behavioral discrimination, a durable, more pernicious form of price
discrimination.
Online behavioral discrimination, as we explore in Virtual
Competition,119 will likely differ from the price discrimination in the brick–
and–mortar world in several important respects. First is the shift from
imperfect price discrimination to near perfect, or first–degree, price
discrimination. Second, sellers can use the personal data to target consumers
with the right emotional pitch to increase overall consumption.120 A third
way behavioral discrimination differs from price discrimination is its
durability.
The U.K. competition authority already found price discrimination to be
more prevalent online.121 With a powerful digital assistant, behavioral
discrimination becomes likelier. The digital assistant can help the super–
platform refine its profile of users, including their likely reservation price
(defined as the upper threshold of willingness to pay), use of outside
options, shopping habits, general interests, and weaknesses (including
moments when their willpower is fatigued).
First, with more personal data about its users’ preferences, habits,
weaknesses, and other traits, the digital assistant can segment users into
even smaller groups to better identify their likely reservation price.122 The
119. See generally EZRACHI & STUCKE, supra note 2.
120. Basically, this process involves manipulating personal data in order to get users
to purchase items they otherwise did not want, at the highest price they are willing to pay.
See Ariel Ezrachi & Maurice E. Stucke, The Rise of Behavioural Discrimination, 37 EUR.
COMPETITION L. REV. 485, 486 (2016).
121. UK SUBMISSION, supra note 106, at 7.
122. Id. at 2. The United Kingdom noted that:
Algorithms can be used to set different prices for different customers,
including through online tracking and profiling of consumers. The
combination of: a) the greater and greater volume of data available to
firms about customers, and b) the increasingly sophisticated means of
using algorithms to swiftly analyse this data and gather very granular
intelligence about customers’ preferences, purchases or price sensitivity,
is likely to increase further the opportunities for firms to engage in
detailed segmentation and price discrimination.
Id. Similarly, Commissioner Terrell McSweeny of the Federal Trade Commission
explained:
Big data and algorithms enable sellers to more effectively target and
price discriminate against specific customers. Thus, even though a
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ride–sharing app, Uber, for example, confirmed in 2017 that it uses
customer data to better price discriminate. As Bloomberg reported:
The new fare system is called “route-based pricing,” and it charges
customers based on what it predicts they’re willing to pay. It’s a
break from the past, when Uber calculated fares using a
combination of mileage, time and multipliers based on geographic
demand. Daniel Graf, Uber’s head of product, said the company
applies machine-learning techniques to estimate how much
groups of customers are willing to shell out for a ride. Uber
calculates riders’ propensity for paying a higher price for a
particular route at a certain time of day. For instance, someone
traveling from a wealthy neighborhood to another tony spot might
be asked to pay more than another person heading to a poorer part
of town, even if demand, traffic and distance are the same.123

Given its ubiquity in the home, a digital assistant will have even more
personal data, more opportunities to observe how users respond to different
advertisements, pricing, and products, and more opportunities to learn the
right price point for that user. VIZIO, as Section III.C discusses, collected
TV data to help third parties analyze a household’s behavior across devices.
Likewise, a digital assistant, connected to the user’s smart television and
search engine, can also monitor whether the user visited a particular website
following a television advertisement related to that website, or whether the
user viewed a particular television program following exposure to an online
advertisement for that program.
But the digital assistant could also be proactive. It can recommend the
entertainment (such as Alexa suggesting a movie produced or distributed by
Amazon), choose the advertisements before the movie, suggest an easy,
frictionless way to buy the advertised product (“Alexa, order me this
company may not have been able to effectively target certain consumers
for higher prices in the past, that in itself is no guarantee that it might not
be able to do so in the future. Data is becoming more robust and
algorithms are becoming more powerful. The Commission defined
markets on the basis of price discrimination in its successful challenge
to the Sysco/U.S. Foods merger — and I would not be surprised to see
the concept of price discrimination markets take on increasing
importance in U.S. antitrust agency challenges going forward.
Terrell McSweeny, Commissioner, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Competition Law: Keeping Pace
in a Digital Age *8 (Apr. 15, 2016), 2016 WL 1613290.
123. Eric Newcomer, Uber Starts Charging What It Thinks You’re Willing to Pay,
BLOOMBERG (May 19, 2017, 12:19 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/201705-19/uber-s-future-may-rely-on-predicting-how-much-you-re-willing-to-pay.
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product”), deliver quickly that product (through Amazon Prime), and if
perishable, remind the user to replenish that product.
Second, as users increasingly converse with and trust it, the digital
assistant can learn what emotional pitch will likely induce the user to buy
products or services that they might not otherwise have wanted.124
Facebook, according to an internal document, promoted advertising
campaigns that exploited its users’ emotional states, including users as
young as fourteen years old:
[T]he selling point of this 2017 document is that Facebook’s
algorithms can determine, and allow advertisers to pinpoint,
“moments when young people need a confidence boost.” If that
phrase isn’t clear enough, Facebook’s document offers a litany of
teen emotional states that the company claims it can estimate
based on how teens use the service, including “worthless,”
“insecure,” “defeated,” “anxious,” “silly,” “useless,” “stupid,”
“overwhelmed,” “stressed,” and “a failure.” . . . [T]he documents
also reveal a particular interest in helping advertisers target
moments in which young users are interested in “looking good and
body confidence” or “working out and losing weight.”125

Facebook denied offering tools to target people based on their emotional
state.126 Nonetheless, the dark side of behavioral economics emerges. The
dominant digital assistant can use the findings from behavioral economics
to advance the platform’s own interest. As observed in 2011 by an executive
of DraftFCB, one of the leaders in thinking about how to incorporate the
discipline of behavioral economics with the practice and business of modern
advertising and marketing:
If anything, behavioral economics impact will only grow in the
future, because it works hand in glove with the growing centrality
of digital solutions in marketing. You can’t understand the success
of digital platforms like Amazon, Facebook, Farmville, Nike Plus,
124. Ezrachi & Stucke, supra note 120.
125. Sam Machkovech, Report: Facebook Helped Advertisers Target Teens Who Feel
“Worthless”, ARS TECHNICA (May 1, 2017, 12:00 AM), https://arstechnica.com/
information-technology/2017/05/facebook-helped-advertisers-target-teens-who-feelworthless/; Nick Whigham, Leaked Document Reveals Facebook Conducted Research to
Target Emotionally Vulnerable and Insecure Youth, NEWS.COM.AU (May 1, 2017, 2:16
PM),
www.news.com.au/technology/online/social/leaked-document-reveals-facebookconducted-research-to-target-emotionally-vulnerable-and-insecure-youth/newsstory/d256f850be6b1c8a21aec6e32dae16fd.
126. Comments on Research and Ad Targeting, FACEBOOK (Apr. 30, 2017),
https://newsroom.fb.com/news/h/comments-on-research-and-ad-targeting/.
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and Groupon if you don’t understand behavioral economic
principles like social proof, the impact of variable intermittent
social rewards, feedback loops, and scarcity. Behavioral
economics will increasingly be providing the behavioral insight
that drives digital strategy.127

Just as Uber uses the findings from behavioral economics to nudge its
drivers,128 so too the digital assistant can reward users for expanding its role
in their daily lives. The digital assistant—in taking on additional tasks—can
nudge users along the path of least resistance, offering an array of new
rewards for their efforts. Companies are already training algorithms to help
them identify human emotions.129 Affectiva, for example, collected over
one billion video frames of facial expressions.130 Its algorithms, according
to its promotional video, can help develop ads that “optimize” a target
audience’s moment–by–moment engagement and predict likely sales and
“virality.”131 Thus, a digital assistant could use “emotion data” to help create
content and advertisements to spur consumption.132
A third way a dominant digital assistant can facilitate behavioral
discrimination is by reducing user exposure to—and incentive to seek—
outside options. Friction is the buzzword for online sellers.133 Amazon is
designing its digital assistant to reduce friction—whether in renting a movie

127. John Kenny et al., Where is Behavioral Economics Headed in the World of
Marketing?, NUDGE BLOG (Oct. 9, 2011), http://nudges.org/2011/10/09/where-isbehavioral-economics-headed-in-the-marketing-worlding/.
128. Noam Scheiber, How Uber Uses Psychological Tricks to Push Its Drivers’
Buttons, N.Y. T IMES (Apr. 2, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/04/02/
technology/uber-drivers-psychological-tricks.html.
129. Luke Dormehl, AI Assistants Will Soon Recognize and Respond to the Emotion in
Your Voice, DIG. TRENDS (Sept. 14, 2017, 11:41 AM), https://www.digitaltrends.com/
cool-tech/affectiva-emotion-in-voice/; Hope Reese, The Machine Knows How You Feel:
How AI Can Detect Emotion, TECHREPUBLIC (Jan. 4, 2016, 7:44 AM), www.techrepublic.
com/article/the-machine-knows-how-you-feel-how-ai-can-detect-emotion/.
130. Dormehl, supra note 129; Affectiva, Affectiva Overview, YOUTUBE (Nov. 6,
2014), https://www.youtube.com/watch?time_continue=162&v=mFrSFMnskI4.
131. Affectiva, supra note 130.
132. Scholars have already begun to consider the practical implications of collecting
and monetizing “emotion data” in the analogous context of autonomous cars, which will
likely be among the technologies to integrate digital assistants. See Determann & Perenz,
supra note 68, at 920 (“Chemical sensors can detect alcohol and perhaps other chemicals
on the breath. If a[n autonomous] vehicle carries such medical sensors, the vehicle–
connected computer might also use the data from them to assess whether the driver and
passengers are hungry and monetize that as an advertising opportunity.”).
133. Marous, supra note 52.
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or buying more batteries.134 For example, users of Amazon’s digital
assistant can sign up for Amazon Prime simply by saying, “Alexa, sign me
up for Prime.”135 Once users are signed up, friction is further reduced for
verbally ordering items or streaming music. An Amazon executive
identified the following questions developers should ask:
x

How many decisions are between a customer and
completing a task?

x

Are each of these decisions absolutely necessary?

x

If so, can you make the decision for the customer by preselecting an option?

x

If not, and the customer absolutely needs to make that
decision, how can you simplify the decision process?

x

If there are multiple decisions, could you combine them
into one decision?

x

Can you present the most important decision first to the
customer?

x

How can you preserve the decision once it’s been made
so that you don’t have to ask the customer again in the
future?136

A digital assistant’s voice activation will reduce friction further. Amazon’s
digital assistant added in 2017 Alexa Show, where users can easily request,
see, and order items from Amazon.137 Indeed, while Alexa Show looks like
a tablet, users primarily converse with it. The greater the ease in conversing
with the digital assistant, the less friction in ordering products and services,
the more likely users will rely on the digital assistant’s recommendations
(rather than turning to their PC or phone to search for, and order, products).
The company comScore predicts that voice searches will make up fifty
percent of all searches by 2020.138
134. Id.
135. Alexa, What Are Your Prime Day Deals?, BUS. WIRE (July 5, 2017, 3:42 AM),
http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20170705005339/en/.
136. Amazon’s Friction-Killing Tactics to Make Products More Seamless, FIRST
ROUND REVIEW, http://firstround.com/review/amazons-friction-killing-tactics-to-makeproducts-more-seamless/ (last visited Oct. 24, 201).
137. WIRED, Amazon’s Alexa Can Now Show You Things | WIRED, YOUTUBE (June
26, 2017), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4TvL8gY-TLQ.
138. Eric Enge, The Rise of Personal Assistants, SEARCH ENGINE LAND (Sept. 12,
2017, 9:49 AM), http://searchengineland.com/rise-personal-assistants-280658.
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This reduction in friction has already increased sales. Amazon Echo
owners in 2016, for example, spent about ten percent more on Amazon than
they did before owning the digital assistant.139 They also purchased from
Amazon six percent more often than they did before the digital assistant.140
According to one press report, “Echo owners may become some of the most
valuable customers to Amazon by repeatedly returning to the marketplace
and making higher average order values, driving up incremental sales gains
for the company.”141 (Likewise, as noted above, Google is coordinating
with Walmart so that users can receive personalized shopping results based
on their online and in–store Walmart purchases.142)
As with search degradation, personalization will make behavioral
discrimination harder to detect. As a digital assistant learns to accommodate
a particular user’s particular tastes, it will be harder to identify when the
digital assistant degrades quality. “As companies collect more user data and
algorithms have more opportunities to experiment (such as presenting items
and suggesting other purchases),” the OECD noted, “pricing becomes more
dynamic, differentiated and personalised.”143 As more online retailers
switch to dynamic (and personalized) pricing and product offerings, it will
be harder for consumers to discover a general market price and to assess
their outside options.144 It may be easier to assess quality degradation for
objective queries (such as the distance between two cities or the current
temperature). But for these objective queries, the digital assistant typically
lacks the incentive to intentionally distort quality. After all, its platform will
139. Amazon Echo Owners Are Spending More Money on Amazon, BUS. INSIDER
(Sept. 19, 2016, 11:30 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/amazon-echo-owners-arespending-more-money-on-amazon-2016-9; Darrell Etherington, Amazon Echo Owners
Spend More on Amazon, Says NPD, TECHCRUNCH (Sept. 15, 2016),
https://techcrunch.com/2016/09/15/amazon-echo-owners-spend-more-on-amazon-saysnpd/.
140. BUS. INSIDER, supra note 139; Etherington, supra note 139.
141. BUS. INSIDER, supra note 139.
142. Sridhar Ramaswamy, Shop Walmart and More of Your Favorite Stores, Faster,
GOOGLE (Aug. 23, 2017), https://www.blog.google/products/assistant/shop-walmart-andmore-your-favorite-stores-faster/ (“For example, if you order Tide PODS or Gatorade,
your Google Assistant will let you know which size and type you previously ordered from
Walmart, making it easy for you to buy the right product again.”).
143. ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV., ALGORITHMS AND COLLUSION BACKGROUND NOTE BY THE SECRETARIAT (2017), https://one.oecd.org/document/DAF/
COMP(2017)4/en/pdf [hereinafter OECD BACKGROUND NOTE].
144. Kathy Kristof, How Amazon Uses “Surge Pricing,” Just Like Uber, CBS NEWS:
MONEYWATCH (July 24, 2017, 10:08 AM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/amazonsurge-pricing-are-you-getting-ripped-off-small-business/.
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not profit by telling users it is twenty–eight degrees Celsius, when it is
actually twenty–six degrees outside. The danger lies in more subjective
queries (or tasks that the digital assistant undertakes automatically).
As a result, digital assistants will blur the line between personalization
and behavioral discrimination. Even when users swim upstream by
searching the web, the ads, products, or search results they see may be
orchestrated by the dominant digital assistant. Consequently, as the assistant
accumulates more information, it will be aware of the extent to which users
venture out and seek other options. Its aim is to deliver the right product or
service at a price that the user is willing to pay. As users increasingly rely
on their popular digital assistant for suggestions, it can increasingly suggest
personalized things (such as on–demand customized clothing145) or services
to buy, and the price it has successfully negotiated. As Google noted in
2017, “[s]ometimes your Assistant should be the one to start [the
conversation]—so over the next few months, we’re bringing proactive
notifications to Google Home.”146 While helping one’s son with his
Spanish, the digital assistant might suggest a particular app or private tutor
that tremendously helped other students struggling with the same issue.
Because the tutoring is customized, it will be harder to assess whether the
price the tutor charges is the fair market price or simply a price its parents
would tolerate. Moreover, if the tutoring service is helping other children
improve their grades, the parents would not want their child to be at a
competitive disadvantage—especially if they eye the same highly selective
universities. Thus, the dominant digital assistant can prompt purchases that
its users otherwise would not consider, at higher prices, even when
competition is a click away.
B.

CONCERNS OVER HOW ECONOMIC POWER CAN TRANSLATE INTO
POLITICAL POWER

The previous Section illustrated how a dominant digital assistant can
confer its provider with market power—namely the ability to command
supra–competitive profits through behavioral discrimination, fees on sellers
seeking to access users, or search degradation. Importantly, the power does
not stop there. As users increasingly rely on the digital assistant, the super–
145. Andrew Tarantola, Adidas Will Knit You a $200 Sweater While You Wait,
ENGADGET (Mar. 21, 2017), https://www.engadget.com/2017/03/21/adidas-will-knit-youa-200-sweater-while-you-wait/.
146. Scott Huffman, Your Google Assistant is Getting Better Across Devices, from
Google Home to Your Phone, GOOGLE (May 17, 2017), https://www.blog.google/products/
assistant/your-assistant-getting-better-on-google-home-and-your-phone/.
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platform can affect not only what users buy, but also their views and the
public debate. The reliance on a powerful gatekeeper could enable its
operator to intellectually capture users, and subsequently decision makers,
in an attempt to ultimately ensure that public opinion and government
policies align with the corporate agenda. While such propositions may
sound apocalyptic, they should not be brushed aside.147 Here we briefly
illustrate several risks that a dominant digital assistant could pose to the
marketplace of ideas.
One risk is bias. Currently, the super–platforms do not report the news.
But many people rely on the super–platforms’ algorithms to find news of
interest. 148 One concern is that users will prefer news that supports their
preexisting beliefs. One 2015 study of over ten million Facebook users
“observed substantial polarization among hard [news] content shared by
users, with the most frequently shared links clearly aligned with largely
liberal or conservative populations.”149 After the algorithm ranked the
stories,150 Facebook users were slightly less likely to see politically different
viewpoints.151 Individual choice, however, further substantially limited

147. We have discussed the fascinating link between market power and intellectual and
regulatory capture at length in Virtual Competition. See EZRACHI & STUCKE, supra note 2,
at 244–47.
148. One 2015 study found that sixty–one percent of Millennials (those born between
1981 and 1996) in the United States were “getting political news on Facebook in a given
week.” Amy Mitchell, Jeffrey Gottfried & Katerina Eva Matsa, Millennials and Political
News: Social Media—The Local TV for the Next Generation?, PEW RES. CTR. (June 1,
2015), http://www.journalism.org/2015/06/01/millennials-political-news/. This was a
much larger percentage than any other news source. Id. A 2016 study found that Facebook
“sends by far the most mobile readers to news sites of any social media sites”—82 percent
of the social traffic to longer news stories and 84 percent of the social traffic to shorter
news articles. Katerina Eva Matsa, Facebook, Twitter Play Different Roles in Connecting
Mobile Readers to News, PEW RES. CTR. (May 9, 2016), http://www.pewresearch.org/facttank/2016/05/09/facebook-twitter-mobile-news/. Overall “8% of voters named Facebook
as their main source for [2016] election news, outpaced only by Fox News (19% of voters)
and CNN (13%).” Jeffrey Gottfried, Michael Barthel & Amy Mitchell, Trump, Clinton
Voters Divided in Their Main Source for Election News, PEW RES. CTR. (Jan. 18, 2017),
http://www.journalism.org/2017/01/18/trump-clinton-voters-divided-in-their-mainsource-for-election-news/.
149. Eytan Bakshy et al., Exposure to Ideologically Diverse News and Opinion on
Facebook, 348 SCIENCE 1130, 1130 (2015).
150. The order in “which users see stories in the News Feed depends on many factors,
including how often the viewer visits Facebook, how much they interact with certain
friends, and how often users have clicked on links to certain websites in News Feed in the
past.” Id. at 1131.
151. Id.
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users’ exposure to ideologically cross–cutting content.152 One article asked
whether the propagation of fake news before the 2016 U.S. election was an
antitrust problem.153 The fake news problem arose after Facebook
implemented product changes that deterred its users from clicking on
external news links, and to rely instead on its Instant Articles.154 Granted,
Facebook did not author the fake news stories; but it can manipulate what
its two billion users can easily see (and not see). One concern with a
dominant digital assistant is that it will not provide an ideologically diverse
news stream.155 Instead a dominant digital assistant will filter the
information users receive based on their preexisting preferences, thereby
further reducing the viewpoints its users receive and leading to “echo
chambers” and “filter bubbles.”156
Moreover, select groups can manipulate the dominant digital assistant’s
algorithm to amplify their message. As The Guardian reported, Google’s
autosuggest may be used to propagate biased views against minorities.157
Partisan groups may also use a more traditional avenue by simply paying
the digital assistant for preferential listing.158 In a world where many users
view their search results as unbiased, camouflaged manipulation, as the
152. Id.
153. Sally Hubbard, Why Fake News is an Antitrust Problem, FORBES (Jan. 10, 2017,
12:00 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/washingtonbytes/2017/01/10/why-fake-newsis-an-antitrust-problem/.
154. Id.
155. Due to pervasive psychological confirmation biases, users are unlikely to want to
hear both the conservative and liberal slant for every news story. See Andrea M.
Matwyshyn, The Law of the Zebra, 28 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 155, 210 (2013) (“Particularly
when the topic is an emotionally-charged or threatening issue, confirmation bias is a
common occurrence.”).
156. OECD BACKGROUND NOTE, supra note 143, at 43; see also ORG. FOR ECON.
COOPERATION & DEV., ALGORITHMS AND COLLUSION - NOTE FROM THE EUROPEAN
COMMISSION 2 (2017) (noting that when it comes to recommending newspaper articles,
personalization can limit the range of views that consumers are exposed to, which is the
so-called “filter bubble” or “echo chamber” phenomenon).
157. Carole Cadwalladr, Google, Democracy and the Truth About Internet Search,
GUARDIAN (Dec. 4, 2016, 5:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/dec/
04/google-democracy-truth-internet-search-facebook; see also Stephanie Bornstein,
Reckless Discrimination, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 1055, 1102 (2017) (“There is also a serious
risk that biasing features could be programmed inadvertently into an algorithm . . . .”);
Solon Barocas & Andrew D. Selbst, Big Data’s Disparate Impact, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 671,
671 (2016) (describing discrimination as “unintentional emergent property” from various
algorithms).
158. Carole Cadwalladr, How to Bump Holocaust Deniers Off Google’s Top Spot? Pay
Google, GUARDIAN (Dec. 17, 2016, 5:32 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/
2016/dec/17/holocaust-deniers-google-search-top-spot.

2017]

DIGITAL ASSISTANTS

1273

Russia’s influence on the 2016 U.S. presidential elections reflects, becomes
a powerful and dangerous tool.159
A second risk is censorship, whereby the dominant digital assistant is
“programmed to control or block the content that certain users are able to
access.”160 The digital assistant can enforce governmental censorship of
information with particular religious, political, and social views. For
example, in 2017 Apple removed several popular apps that enabled users to
evade government censorship from the Chinese version of its app store.161
Or the super–platform can self–censor as to what is appropriate content.
Facebook is grappling with this issue. In 2017, it asked users for input on
several questions, including:
x

How aggressively should social media companies
monitor and remove controversial posts and images from
their platforms?

x

Who gets to decide what’s controversial, especially in a
global community with a multitude of cultural norms?

x

Who gets to define what’s false news — and what’s
simply controversial political speech? 162

Ultimately the answers to these questions will come not from users, but the
powerful super–platform. It will ultimately decide what news its digital
assistant will provide and to whom. One early example occurred when
Google’s digital assistant censored a Burger King video. According to the
New York Times, the video stated:
“You’re watching a 15-second Burger King ad, which is
unfortunately not enough time to explain all the fresh ingredients
in the Whopper sandwich,” the actor in the commercial said. “But
I got an idea. O.K. Google, what is the Whopper burger?”
Prompted by the phrase “O.K. Google,” the Google Home device

159. Mike Isaac & Daisuke Wakabayashi, Russian Influence Reached 126 Million
Through Facebook Alone, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 30, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/
30/technology/facebook-google-russia.html; Marguerite Reardon et al., Congress Grills
Facebook, Twitter, Google Over Russian Influence, CNET (Nov. 1, 2017, 1:56 PM),
www.cnet.com/news/congress-grills-facebook-twitter-google-over-russian-influence/.
160. OECD BACKGROUND NOTE, supra note 143, at 43.
161. Paul Mozur, Apple Removes Apps from China Store That Help Internet Users
Evade Censorship, N.Y. TIMES (July 30, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/
30/technology/china-apple-censorhip.html.
162. Elliot Schrage, Introducing Hard Questions, FACEBOOK (June 15, 2017),
https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2017/06/hard-questions/.
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beside the TV in the video lit up, searched the phrase on Wikipedia
and stated the ingredients. But within hours of the ad’s release —
and humorous edits to the Whopper Wikipedia page by
mischievous users — tests from The Verge and BuzzFeed showed
that the commercial had stopped activating the device. Burger
King, which did not work with Google on the ad, said Google
appeared to make changes by Wednesday afternoon that stopped
the commercial from waking the devices, in what amounted to an
unusual form of corporate warfare in the living room. Google,
which previously said it had not been consulted on the campaign,
did not respond to requests for comment.163

Censoring a fast–food restaurant’s annoying advertisement may not cause
much alarm. In fact, many may welcome it. But Google can also censor its
maps, YouTube videos, Google News, AdWords, and search engine
results.164 Thus we can see why conservatives and socialists are raising
concerns about Google censoring their viewpoints.165 Conservatives were
also concerned over allegations in 2016 that the social network Facebook
manipulated for political purposes the rankings of news stories for its users,
suppressing conservative viewpoints.166 (Facebook denied doing this.)167
A third risk is manipulation, whereby the dominant digital assistant’s
algorithms select information according to particular business or political
interests (of the super–platform), instead of its relevance or quality.168 The
163. Sapna Maheshwari, Burger King ‘O.K. Google’ Ad Doesn’t Seem O.K. With
Google, N.Y. TIMES (Ap. 12, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/12/business/
burger-king-tv-ad-google-home.html.
164. Robert Epstein, The New Censorship, U.S NEWS & WORLD REPORT (June 22,
2016, 9:00 AM), https://www.usnews.com/opinion/articles/2016-06-22/google-is-theworlds-biggest-censor-and-its-power-must-be-regulated.
165. Leo Goldstein, Google’s Search Bias Against Conservative News Sites Has Been
Quantified, WUWT (Sept. 8, 2017), https://wattsupwiththat.com/2017/09/08/a-method-ofgoogle-search-bias-quantification-and-its-application-in-climate-debate-and-generalpolitical-discourse/ (“Google Search is biased in favor of left/liberal websites against
conservative websites, and is extremely biased in favor of climate alarmism against climate
realism.”); Tucker Warns About ‘Ominous’ Google Censorship of Political Content, FOX
NEWS INSIDER (Sept. 7, 2017, 9:31 PM), http://insider.foxnews.com/2017/09/07/tuckerominous-google-censorship-certain-political-content; Peter Hasson, Anti-Corporate
Voices on Both Right and Left Claim Google Censorship, DAILY CALLER (Aug. 31, 2017,
7:53 PM), http://dailycaller.com/2017/08/31/anti-corporate-voices-on-both-right-and-leftclaim-google-censorship/.
166. Deepa Seetharaman, Facebook Rebuts Criticisms About a Bias Against
Conservatives, WALL ST. J. (May 10, 2016, 8:41 AM), www.wsj.com/articles/facebookrefutes-criticisms-about-a-bias-against-conservatives-1462890206.
167. Id.
168. OECD BACKGROUND NOTE, supra note 143, at 43.
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composition and order of the news feed can affect users’ inclinations. With
sixty–one percent of Millennials relying on the social network to receive
their news, the power of the network becomes clear. Users rely on the
super–platforms, in part, because they believe the algorithms objectively
identify the most relevant results.169 But Google’s conduct with Froogle
demonstrates, a powerful platform can intentionally degrade the quality of
its search results to promote its own corporate interests. Robert Epstein
illustrated how Google, in manipulating the rankings of its search results,
could shift the voting preferences of undecided voters by “20 percent or
more—up to 80 percent in some demographic groups—with virtually no
one knowing they are being manipulated.”170 Other dominant super–
platforms like Facebook can also manipulate elections.171 Jonathan Zittrain
has warned of the super–platform’s potential ability to predict political
views, identify party affiliation, and engage in targeted campaigning to
mobilize distinct groups of voters to take action.172 Indeed, Russian
operatives established competing Facebook groups, the chair of the Senate
Intelligence Committee noted, to “fuel divisions among Americans.”173
Super–platforms have already used their market dominance to promote
certain corporate agendas. Google, for example, used its homepage to
protest against the Stop Online Piracy Act, asking users to petition
Congress.174 Consumer Watchdog, in comparing the search results of Bing,
DuckDuckGo, and Google, accused Google of “manipulating its search
engine results to favor opposition” to Section 230 of the Communications
Decency Act.175 Google was leading the “[t]ech industry efforts to block

169. Claire Cain Miller, When Algorithms Discriminate, N.Y. TIMES (July 9, 2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/10/upshot/when-algorithms-discriminate.html.
170. Robert Epstein, How Google Could Rig The 2016 Election, POLITICO (Aug. 19,
2015), http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2015/08/how-google-could-rig-the-2016election-121548.
171. Jonathan Zittrain, Facebook Could Decide an Election Without Anyone Ever
Finding Out, NEW REPUBLIC (June 1, 2014), https://newrepublic.com/article/117878/
information-fiduciary-solution-facebook-digital-gerrymandering.
172. Id.
173. Mary Louise Kelley, Ryan Lucas & Richard Burr, How Russia Used Facebook to
Organize 2 Sets of Protesters, NPR (Nov. 1, 2017, 4:53 PM), https://www.npr.org/2017/
11/01/561427876/how-russia-used-facebook-to-organize-two-sets-of-protesters.
174. Jared Newman, SOPA and PIPA: Just the Facts, PCWORLD (Jan. 17, 2012, 6:00
PM), https://www.pcworld.com/article/248298/sopa_and_pipa_just_the_facts.html.
175. John M. Simpson, Google Appears to Be Manipulating Its Search Engine Results
to Defend Internet Law that Enables Sex Trafficking, Consumer Watchdog Finds,
CONSUMER WATCHDOG (Sept. 11, 2017), http://www.consumerwatchdog.org/newsrelease
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any amendment to Section 230, which protects websites from liability for
material posted by third parties on their sites.”176 As Consumer Watchdog
found, “[t]hree of the top four links returned under the news tab for the
search term ‘Section 230’ were to articles from the Electronic Frontier
Foundation, a staunch opponent of amending the Internet law.”177 In
contrast, Bing and DuckDuckGo “gave links to articles presenting all sides
of the issue.”178
As the European Commissioner concluded:
The way that algorithms are used to make decisions automatically
could even undermine our democracy. These days, social media
is a vital source of news. One recent study found that nearly two
thirds of US adults get their news this way. So the scope for social
media algorithms to create an alternative reality, by showing
people one story after another that just isn't true, is a concern for
us all.”179

If users increasingly rely on one digital assistant, it will increasingly
learn about many citizens’ social and political views, behavior, and
susceptibility to biases. Facebook, for example, “collects data on roughly
1.6 billion people, including ‘likes’ and social connections, which it uses to
look for behavioral patterns such as voting habits, relationship status and
how interactions with certain types of content might make people feel.”180
But Facebook does not simply passively collect data about its users; it also
has the power to affect behavior. One study, which later proved quite
controversial, sought to examine “emotional contagion,” whereby people
transfer positive and negative moods and emotions to others.181 This was
the “first experimental evidence for massive-scale emotional contagion via
/google-appears-be-manipulating-its-search-engine-results-defend-internet-law-enables-s0.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Margrethe Vestager, Comm’r, European Comm’n for Competition, Algorithms
and Competition, Address at Bundeskartellamt 18th Conference on Competition (Mar. 16,
2017),
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/commissioners/2014-2019/vestager/
announcements/bundeskartellamt-18th-conference-competition-berlin-16-march2017_en.
180. Daniela Hernandez & Deepa Seetharaman, Facebook Offers Details on How It
Handles Research, WALL ST. J. (June 14, 2016), http://www.wsj.com/articles/facebookoffers-details-how-it-handles-research-1465930152.
181. Adam D. I. Kramer, Jamie E. Guillory & Jeffrey T. Hancock, Experimental
Evidence of Massive-Scale Emotional Contagion Through Social Networks, 111 PROC.
NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 8788 (2014).
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social networks.”182 People, when posting of Facebook, frequently express
positive or negative emotions.183 Their friends later see these posts via
Facebook’s “News Feed” product. Facebook uses a ranking algorithm that
continually tests which content is shown or omitted in the News Feed.184
The aim is to show particular Facebook users “the content they will find
most relevant and engaging.”185 Facebook, as part of the study, intentionally
manipulated its News Feed algorithm.186 Some users received less positive
content.187 Other received less negative emotional content.188
Did that manipulation impact what the 689,003 test subjects posted?189
It did. When Facebook surreptitiously reduced friends’ positive content in
the News Feed for one week, the users were less positive: “a larger
percentage of words in the users’ status updates were negative and a smaller
percentage were positive.”190 When Facebook surreptitiously reduced their
friends’ negative content in the News Feed, the Facebook users were less
negative themselves. People who were exposed to fewer emotional posts
(either positive or negative) in their News Feed “were less expressive
overall on the following days.”191 Thus by manipulating the News Feed,
Facebook could influence users’ moods.
Interestingly, Facebook could manipulate users’ emotions without
prohibiting users from accessing content. The users’ search costs were low,
because their friends’ content:
was always available by viewing a friend’s content directly by
going to that friend’s wall” or “timeline,” rather than via the News
Feed. Further, the omitted content may have appeared on prior or
subsequent views of the News Feed. Finally, the experiment did
not affect any direct messages sent from one user to another.192

If Facebook can affect a user’s mood and engagement by simply promoting
some content over another in the user’s News Feed, just imagine the power

182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.

Id. at 8789.
Id. at 8788.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 8788–89.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 8789.
Id. at 8790.
Id. at 8789.
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of a dominant digital assistant to affect citizens’ moods, behavior, and
views.
Ultimately, in a world where digital assistants play a key role as a
gateway to news, they will have the power to affect its composition.
Without noticing, citizens could outsource the task of shaping their world
view to a dominant corporation. Normally, with power comes great
responsibility.193 That is indeed the case in EU competition law when a firm
dominates markets for goods and services.194 This concern of the super–
platform’s shirking of this responsibility arose with fake news. As
worldwide web inventor Tim Berners-Lee noted:
Today, most people find news and information on the web through
just a handful of social media sites and search engines. These sites
make more money when we click on the links they show us. And,
they choose what to show us based on algorithms which learn
from our personal data that they are constantly harvesting. The net
result is that these sites show us content they think we’ll click on
– meaning that misinformation, or ‘fake news’, which is
surprising, shocking, or designed to appeal to our biases can
spread like wildfire. And through the use of data science and
armies of bots, those with bad intentions can game the system to
spread misinformation for financial or political gain.195

Thus, when a few gatekeepers dominate the digital assistant market,
economic power can translate into political power—be it through payment
by third parties or as a result of the platform itself opting to advance one
agenda over another. The marketplace of ideas, just like online markets for
goods and services, may be manipulated.

193. Meng Ding, Perfect 10 v. Amazon.com: A Step Toward Copyright’s Tort Law
Roots, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 373, 373 (2008) (quoting SPIDER-MAN (Columbia Pictures
2002)).
194. Case C-413/14 P, Intel Corp. v. Commission, ¶ 135 (Sept. 6, 2017),
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf;jsessionid=9ea7d0f130d5d76741cb58
524179974ae33bfb72e370.e34KaxiLc3eQc40LaxqMbN4PaN8Oe0?text=&docid=19408
2&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=req&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=195067 (“[A]
dominant undertaking has a special responsibility not to allow its behaviour to impair
genuine, undistorted competition on the internal market”).
195. Tim Berners-Lee, Three Challenges for the Web, According to Its Inventor,
WORLD WIDE WEB FOUND. (Mar. 12, 2017), http://webfoundation.org/2017/03/web-turns28-letter/.
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PRIVACY CONCERNS

Smartphones currently collect and store an immense amount of data
(including information that users may not ever use, such as their movements
or search history).196 As Google, Apple, Facebook and other leading tech
firms told the Supreme Court in 2017:
People search online for all manner of information, including
medical advice, and rely on the Internet for their jobs, schooling,
and interpersonal communications. They reveal their habits,
views, and preferences by interacting with apps used to navigate
almost every facet of their lives. They store photos and emails in
the cloud, rely on data-collecting devices such as fitness trackers
to manage their health, and use smart appliances to provide home
security and efficiency. For many of these activities, there is no
analog-era analogy; in the past, for instance, a user did not have
to tell a company when and how he wanted to adjust his
thermostat, thereby risking losing all privacy protection in that
information.197

Digital assistants (and the smart technologies connected with them) aim
to collect even more personal data. A 2017 criminal case offers a glimpse
at the potential privacy implications created by digital assistants. The
Bentonville Police Department in Arkansas was investigating a death at the
defendant’s residence.198 The defendant was charged with first–degree
murder.199 While searching the defendant’s residence, the police seized an
Echo device.200 The police next served Amazon with a warrant seeking any
audio recordings and transcripts that were created as a result of interactions
with defendant’s Amazon Echo.201 Citing “important First Amendment and
privacy implications at stake,” Amazon sought to quash the search warrant

196. Brief for Technology Companies as Amici Curiae in Support of Neither Party at
18, Carpenter v. United States, No. 16-402, 2017 WL 3530959 (U.S. Aug. 14, 2017)
([hereinafter Carpenter Amicus Brief]. Nest Labs, which manufactures smart thermostats,
and its parent Google were among the amici. Id.
197. Id. at 27.
198. Memorandum of Law in Support of Amazon’s Motion to Quash Search Warrant
at 6, State v. Bates, No. CR-2016-370-2 (Cir. Ct. Ark., Feb. 17, 2017) [hereinafter Amazon
Memorandum].
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id.
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“unless the Court finds that the State has met its heightened burden for
compelled production of such materials.”202
As Amazon told the court, the privacy concerns were significant. Its
digital assistant “can be commanded to, among other things, play music,
stream podcasts, play audio books, request information about various
subjects, or request ‘real-time information,’ including news, weather, and
traffic conditions related to the user’s or any other location.”203 As one
example, “users may ask for information about a sensitive health condition
or a controversial political figure.”204 Users can also use their digital
assistant to order products from Amazon, including books and other
expressive materials. Thus, the digital assistant sweeps in significant
amounts of data that can “reveal much more in combination than any
isolated record.” 205 Those with access to the data can reconstruct “[t]he sum
of an individual’s private life.”206
Amazon was concerned with governmental invasions of its users’
privacy and First Amendment interests. As Amazon cautioned, “the
knowledge that government agents are seeking records concerning
customer purchases of expressive material from Amazon ‘would frost
keyboards across America.’”207 Indeed, “‘rumors of an Orwellian federal
criminal investigation into the reading habits of Amazon’s customers could
frighten countless potential customers’ into cancelling their online
purchases through Amazon, ‘now and perhaps forever,’ resulting in a
chilling effect on the public’s willingness to purchase expressive
materials.”208
Eventually, after the defendant consented, Amazon disclosed the
information to the State.209 But government surveillance remains a concern.
Facebook, Apple, and Google, among others, recently impressed this point
202. Id. at 1. Amazon argued that the State must demonstrate: (1) a compelling need
for the information sought, including that it is not available from other sources; and (2) a
sufficient nexus between the information and the subject of the criminal investigation. Id.
at 2.
203. Id. at 5.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 9 (quoting Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2489 (2014)).
206. Id. (quoting Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2489).
207. Id. at 14 (quoting In re Grand Jury Subpoena to Amazon.com Dated August 7,
2006, 246 F.R.D. 570, 573 (W.D. Wis. 2007) [hereinafter Grand Jury Subpoena]).
208. Id. (quoting Grand Jury Subpoena, 246 F.R.D. at 573).
209. Andrew Blake, Amazon Gives Up Alexa Data Sought in Murder Probe, WASH.
TIMES (Mar. 8, 2017), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2017/mar/8/amazon-givesalexa-data-sought-murder-probe/.

2017]

DIGITAL ASSISTANTS

1281

to the Supreme Court: “While amici’s customers understand that data is
collected by service providers as part of providing digital technologies,
customers still expect privacy with respect to other parties, including the
government.”210 As the amici argued, “[d]igital technologies have become
a necessary aspect of life today.”211 Individuals cannot realistically forgo
these technologies; nor can users of these digital technologies avoid
transmitting sensitive data to the technologies’ service providers.
Nonetheless, users expect that data to remain private.212
But it is questionable whether the accused can challenge under the
Fourth Amendment any warrantless search or seizure of data Amazon’s
digital assistant collects from individuals. This is because the accused—
under a line of Supreme Court cases—would have no reasonable
expectation of privacy in the data they share with third parties, like
Amazon.213
Another concern is covert government surveillance. One example,
according to WikiLeaks documents disclosed on the subject, is the Central
Intelligence Agency’s “Weeping Angel” program. The CIA basically
210. Carpenter Amicus Brief, supra note 196.
211. Id. at 13.
212. Id. at 17. The amici rely in part on a poll by the Pew Research Center, where “93%
of adults say that being in control of who can get information about them is important: 74%
feel this is ‘very important’; 19% say it is ‘somewhat important.’ 90% say that controlling
what information is collected about them is important—65% think it is ‘very important’
and 25% say it is ‘somewhat important.’” Id. at 19 n.3 (quoting Mary Madden & Lee
Rainie, Americans’ Attitudes About Privacy, Security and Surveillance, PEW RES. CTR.
(May 20, 2015), www.pewinternet.org/2015/05/20/americans-attitudes-about-privacysecurity-and-surveillance/). Additionally, “Americans say they do not wish to be observed
without their approval; 88% say it is important that they not have someone watch or listen
to them with- out their permission (67% feel this is ‘very important’ and 20% say it is
‘somewhat important’).” Id.
213. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976) (holding that the government,
consistent with the Fourth Amendment, can obtain “information revealed to a third-party
and conveyed by him to government authorities, even if the information is revealed on the
assumption that it will be used only for a limited purpose and the confidence placed in the
third-party will not be betrayed”); Sarah Wilson, Compelling Passwords from Third
Parties: Why the Fourth and Fifth Amendments Do Not Adequately Protect Individuals
when Third Parties Are Forced to Hand Over Passwords, 30 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1, 14
(2015) (explaining that the third–party doctrine strips users of privacy rights in stored
passwords); Mark Daniel Langer, Rebuilding Bridges: Addressing the Problems of
Historic Cell Site Location Information, 29 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 955, 965 (2014)
(criticizing application of the third–party doctrine to location information gathered from
smartphones); Erin Murphy, The Case Against the Case for Third-Party Doctrine: A
Response to Epstein and Kerr, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1239, 1250 (2009) (criticizing the
third–party doctrine generally).
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hacked smart televisions, transforming them into covert microphones.214
“After infestation, Weeping Angel places the target TV in a ‘Fake-Off’
mode, so that the owner falsely believes the TV is off when it is on. In ‘FakeOff’ mode the TV operates as a bug, recording conversations in the room
and sending them over the Internet to a covert CIA server.”215 The CIA
could also remotely hack and control popular smartphones, which could be
instructed to send the CIA “the user’s geolocation, audio and text
communications as well as covertly activate the phone’s camera and
microphone.”216 Presumably, other governments would have similar
incentives and ability to hack digital assistants to monitor and gather
evidence. In an unconcentrated digital assistant market, personal data is
dispersed across many firms. In contrast, in a monopolized market, personal
data is concentrated in one or few firms. This increases the government’s
incentive to circumvent the firm’s privacy protections and tap into the
digital assistant’s capabilities.217 Also, the fewer the number of firms
controlling the personal data, the risk increases that the government will
“capture” the firms, using its many levers.218
But another privacy concern, which Amazon did not address in its court
filing, is the private collection and use of this data. A 2017 FTC case against
the television manufacturer VIZIO suggests the extent to which private
214. Press Release, Wikileaks, Vault 7: CIA Hacking Tools Revealed (Mar. 7, 2017),
https://wikileaks.org/ciav7p1/.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. See, e.g., Barton Gellman & Ashkan Soltani, NSA Infiltrates Links To Yahoo,
Google Data Centers Worldwide, Snowden Documents Say, WASH. POST (Oct. 30, 2013),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-infiltrates-links-to-yahoogoogle-data-centers-worldwide-snowden-documents-say/2013/10/30/e51d661e-416611e3-8b74-d89d714ca4dd_story.html.
218. Kelton Sears, Alexa and the Dawn of So-What Surveillance, SEATTLE WEEKLY
(Mar. 29, 2017, 1:30 AM), http://www.seattleweekly.com/news/alexa-and-the-dawn-ofso-what-surveillance/. On the one hand, a dominant firm might have the resources to fight
off the government. On the other hand, as personal data is spread out across many firms,
there are more firms that the government would have to bribe (or coerce) to access the data.
As the number of bribes increase, the lower the likely value of each bribe to each firm
possessing the personal data, and the greater the likelihood that the bribe will be less than
the value to the digital assistant producer for securing the data. Moreover, a dominant firm
is likely to lobby the government on many more fronts. Brian Fung & Hamza Shaban, To
Understand How Dominant Tech Companies Are, See What They Lobby For, L.A. TIMES
(Sept. 1, 2017, 12:55 PM), http://www.latimes.com/business/technology/la-fi-tn-siliconvalley-lobbying-20170901-story.html. This can increase the likelihood of secretly
cooperating with the government in accessing the data if doing so yields greater benefits
on the other fronts.
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collection might have dangerous implications for consumer rights. 219 The
FTC alleged that since February 2014, VIZIO televisions continuously
tracked what consumers were watching.220 Over ten million VIZIO
televisions transmitted information about what the viewer was watching “on
a second-by-second basis.”221 Why the intrusive tracking? VIZIO profited
from selling the consumers’ television viewing history to third parties.222
One purpose for the viewing data was to analyze advertising effectiveness.
With the VIZIO TV data, third parties could analyze a household’s behavior
across devices, for example, “(a) whether a consumer has visited a particular
website following a television advertisement related to that website, or (b)
whether a consumer has viewed a particular television program following
exposure to an online advertisement for that program.”223 Another purpose
for the viewing data was to better target the household members on their
other digital devices.224
VIZIO eventually settled.225 An outstanding legal issue was whether
VIZIO’s disclosure was “unfair” or “deceptive” under section 5 of the FTC
Act. As the FTC alleged, consumers were never directly informed that their
new VIZIO televisions were tracking their viewing habits or selling this
data to better target them with personal ads.226 The acting FTC Chair
concurred in the enforcement action only because VIZIO deceptively
omitted information about its data collection and sharing program.227 But
she did not support the count in the complaint alleging that VIZIO’s
collection and sharing of the data without consumers’ consent was
inherently “unfair.”228
219. Complaint for Permanent Injunction and Other Equitable and Monetary Relief,
FTC v. VIZIO, Inc., No. 2:17-cv-00758 (D.N.J. Feb. 6, 2017) [hereinafter FTC Complaint],
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/170206_vizio_2017.02.06
_complaint.pdf.
220. Id. at 4.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 5.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, VIZIO to Pay $2.2 Million to FTC, State of
New Jersey to Settle Charges It Collected Viewing Histories on 11 Million Smart
Televisions without Users’ Consent (Feb. 6, 2017), https://www.ftc.gov/newsevents/press-releases/2017/02/vizio-pay-22-million-ftc-state-new-jersey-settle-charges-it.
226. See FTC Complaint, supra note 219, at 9.
227. In re Vizio, Inc., FTC File No. 1623024 (Feb. 6, 2017) (concurring statement of
Acting Chair Maureen K. Ohlhausen), https://www.ftc.gov/public-statements/2017/02/
concurring-statement-acting-chairman-maureen-k-ohlhausen-matter-vizio-inc.
228. Id.
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The VIZIO enforcement action illustrates the privacy implications of a
dominant digital assistant. First, it appears that a dominant digital assistant
can collect this personal information. Based on the Acting Chair’s
construction of the FTC Act, a super–platform can use its digital assistant
to track consumers, collect their data, develop personal profiles, and target
them with behavioral ads. It can even sell that data to third parties. All that
seems to be required is that it discloses the collection and use of data to
consumers. But suppose Amazon or Google state broadly in its privacy
statement that the data it collects across its products and services is used for
advertising purposes. Whether or not this disclosure is sufficient to infer
consent remains unclear.229
A second issue is what constitutes consent and who must consent. The
FTC complaint focused on consumers that purchased VIZIO televisions.
But a dominant digital assistant will sweep in data from children, other
household members, relatives, friends, and others in the house. With facial
recognition technology, a dominant digital assistant can track individuals
across neighborhoods and cities.230 It is unclear whether the super–platform
has to inform (or obtain consent from) anyone besides the purchaser of the
tracking.
A third issue is control over the data. Nothing under the current U.S.
law provides adults (or teenagers) with a way to review the personal
information that the dominant digital assistant collected about them, nor
does current law give them a way to revoke their consent and refuse the
further use or collection of personal information, or to delete already–
retained personal information.231
Ultimately consent has less significance when dealing with a
monopoly.232 Firms can exercise market power multiple ways, such as

229. Amazon Privacy Notice, AMAZON (Aug. 29, 2017), https://www.amazon.com/gp/
help/customer/display.html?nodeId=468496.
230. Nowhere to Hide: What Machines Can Tell from Your Face, ECONOMIST (Sept.
9, 2017), https://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21728617-life-age-facial-recognitionwhat-machines-can-tell-your-face.
231. The Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998, which affords these
protections, applies to data collected on children under thirteen years old. Children’s
Online Privacy Protection Rule, 16 C.F.R. § 312.2 (2017).
232. US Airways, Inc. v. Sabre Holdings Corp., No. 11 CIV. 2725 (LGS), 2017 WL
1064709, at *13 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 21, 2017) (evidence of market power includes forcing
customers “to do things they would not do in a competitive market, such as signing
contracts with terms they would not otherwise accept”).
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raising price or reducing quality.233 One facet of competition for “free”
goods is privacy protection.234 Just as a monopoly retailer can increase price
above competitive levels, so too a dominant digital assistant can depress
privacy protections below competition levels.235 As the European
Commission found when reviewing the Microsoft/LinkedIn merger,
consumer choice and privacy protection would be substantially reduced.236
A dominant digital assistant could collect more personal data and provide
less privacy protection than it otherwise could in a competitive market.237
Users would have no real choice.238 Instead, they would have to rely on the
monopolist’s beneficence for any privacy protections. This is especially
troubling when the digital assistant is connected not only to a user’s TV set,
but to computers, smart appliances, security cameras, smartphones, and
smart cars, as well as the super–platform’s other services (such as search
engines, email, maps, and the like).
Thus, unlike monopolies of the past, a dominant digital assistant will
know far more intimate details about consumers.239 Even something as
innocuous as a smart thermometer can detect and transmit “not just a
233. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER
GUIDELINES 2 (2010), www.justice.gov/atr/horizontal-merger-guidelines-08192010 (“A
merger enhances market power if it is likely to encourage one or more firms to raise price,
reduce output, diminish innovation, or otherwise harm customers as a result of diminished
competitive constraints or incentives.”).
234. STUCKE & GRUNES, supra note 40, at ch. 17.
235. Id.; Press Release, European Comm’n, Mergers: Commission Approves
Acquisition of LinkedIn by Microsoft, Subject to Conditions (Dec. 6, 2016),
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-4284_en.htm (“[T]he Commission concluded
that data privacy was an important parameter of competition between professional social
networks on the market, which could have been negatively affected by the transaction.”).
236. See, e.g., Microsoft/LinkedIn Decision, supra note 22, ¶ 350 (“[T]o the extent that
these foreclosure effects would lead to the marginalisation of an existing competitor which
offers a greater degree of privacy protection to users than LinkedIn (or make the entry of
any such competitor more difficult), the Transaction would also restrict consumer choice
in relation to this important parameter of competition when choosing” a professional social
network).
237. Eleonora Ocello & Cristina Sjödin, Microsoft/LinkedIn: Big Data and
Conglomerate Effects in Tech Markets, EUR. COMMISSION: COMPETITION MERGER BRIEF
5 (May 2017), http://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/cmb/2017/kdal17001enn.pdf
(discussing how the foreclosure of competing networks post-merger could adversely
impact the choice of consumers as to the level of data protection offered, as some
competitors offered a greater degree of privacy protection to users than LinkedIn).
238. Id.
239. Carpenter Amicus Brief, supra note 196, at 25 (noting how “digital devices and
services produce and record data that, alone or in the aggregate, has the potential to reveal
highly sensitive information about all aspects of our private lives”).
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home’s temperature, but information about the homeowner’s habits—
whether and when the occupants are home, and where they are in the
home.”240
Nor does simply shutting off the digital assistant offer a viable
alternative in a modern world that is so heavily dependent on integrated
technology. A total ban on internet use, the Seventh Circuit found back in
2003, would sweep more broadly and impose a greater deprivation on
defendant’s liberty than was necessary: “such a ban renders modern life—
in which, for example, the government strongly encourages taxpayers to file
their returns electronically, where more and more commerce is conducted
on-line, and where vast amounts of government information are
communicated via website—exceptionally difficult.”241 Smartphones, as
the Supreme Court recognized, “are now such a pervasive and insistent part
of daily life.”242 The Court cited one 2013 poll where “nearly three-quarters
of smartphone users report being within five feet of their phones most of
the time, with 12 percent admitting that they even use their phones in the
shower.”243 More than twice as many respondents in another poll “were
willing to give up sex instead of their smart phone or caffeine.”244 With the
rise of smart appliances, it will be even harder to turn off a digital assistant
and smartphone.245
But if any super–platform abused its position of trust, some might
respond, one can turn to more privacy–focused alternatives. Yes Google,
Apple, Facebook, and Amazon may strive to be the dominant digital
assistant. But other companies may launch competing assistants. Thus, if a
super– platform failed to respect users’ privacy, one issue is whether users
would opt for another digital assistant. As this Part explored, however,
market competition may not effectively cure these privacy concerns
because users may be unaware of some of the tactics the super–platform
deploys to increase its profitability while undermining its users’ welfare.
Another problem, as the next Part explores, is that the ability to switch
digital assistants may be more limited than one might anticipate.

240. Id.
241. United States v. Holm, 326 F.3d 872, 877 (7th Cir. 2003).
242. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2484 (2014).
243. Id. at 2490.
244. Poll: Americans Choose Smartphones Over Sex, SACHS MEDIA GRP. (Apr. 12,
2017), https://sachsmedia.com/news/poll-americans-choose-smartphones-over-sex/.
245. Carpenter Amicus Brief, supra note 196, at 16 (noting how forgoing the use of
networked devices would render modern life exceptionally difficult).

2017]

IV.

DIGITAL ASSISTANTS

1287

WHY THE LEADING DIGITAL ASSISTANT WILL LIKELY
BE FROM GOOGLE, APPLE, FACEBOOK, OR AMAZON

With the possibility that a digital assistant can act against its users’
interest, one would expect and hope for a “virtuous assistant”—a class of
independent assistants, developed by independent firms that prioritized
consumer interests. These virtuous assistants could warn users when
behavioral discrimination is at play, when outside options are ignored, when
price alignment seems out of order, or when personal data is collected. They
may even deploy countermeasures to maximize user welfare in the face of
such strategies. They could monitor news feed and alert users if they are
targeted with particular stories (or missing stories from traditional
journalism outlets). They can promote users’ interest—aware of their
preferences and safeguarding their autonomy.
Predicting the leading technology five years from now is tricky. But
several factors favor one of the four super–platforms (Google, Apple,
Amazon, and Facebook) capturing the digital assistant market, and
disfavoring an independent virtuous assistant. To work well (and gain
popularity), the digital assistant will likely have to operate from an existing
platform—such as a mobile platform—and in order to tap into the vast
wealth of preexisting data offered by such platforms. This is true for several
reasons: first, the scale and scope of data needed favor emergence from a
platform; second, the data–driven network effects are best effectuated by a
platform, and third, platforms can facilitate the integration of the digital
assistant with other apps and services, such as texts, mapping, photographs,
and more.
Personal data is the first key element. To provide relevant services and
recommendations, the digital assistant must first learn the user’s habits and
preferences. To learn their preferences and predict the users’ desires, digital
assistants will require a significant volume and variety of personal data.
Absent these features, an “isolated” helper would be of little use and
value—indeed, it would not be a personal digital assistant. Based on the
user’s personal data—including chat history, geolocation, previous
purchasers, and browsing habits—the digital assistant can provide and
anticipate personalized recommendations.
Some argue that the value is not from the data or the data–driven
network effects, but the algorithms that process the data. But if this were
true, noted Lukas Biewald, co–founder and CEO of CrowdFlower, the big
tech players IBM, Facebook, Google, and Microsoft would not open source
some of their algorithms “without worrying too much about giving away
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any secrets.”246 As Biewald noted, “it’s because the actual secret sauce isn’t
the algorithm, it’s the data. Just think about Google. They can release
TensorFlow without a worry that someone else will come along and create
a better search engine because there are over a trillion searches on Google
each year.”247 Another example is Facebook’s M, where the underlying
code and algorithms are largely open source.248 The key assets are not the
algorithms—otherwise, why would Facebook share them? Instead, the key
is the combination of the scale and scope of data, and the algorithm’s ability
to learn by trial–and–error. As the Wall Street Journal reported, “Facebook
Messenger already has more than 700 million users,” which yields it the
following advantage: “with access to so many users, Facebook has a
plausible way to get the gigantic quantity of conversational data required to
make a chat-based assistant sufficiently automated.”249 With more users
making more requests, M can quickly process more tasks easily.250 By
learning through servicing users, digital assistants can take a proactive
role—anticipating the user’s needs and wants—rather than merely
following instructions. This requires the platform to have enough users,
data, and opportunities to experiment to train the algorithms.251 The super–
platforms already possess far more personal data than any startup could
readily and affordably obtain.252 New entrants will be at a significant
disadvantage. Any independent virtuous assistant will likely lack the scale

246. Daniel Gutierrez, Human-in-the-Loop is the Future of Machine Learning,
(Jan. 11, 2016), http://insidebigdata.com/2016/01/11/human-in-theloop-is-the-future-of-machine-learning/.
247. Id.
248. Mims, supra note 17.
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. STUCKE & GRUNES, supra note 40, at 181–82.
252. Japan's Antimonopoly Law At Turning Point, STANDARD EXAM’R (Sept. 18,
2017, 9:56 AM), http://www.standard.net/Business/2017/09/18/Japan-s-antimonopolylaw-at-turning-point; Fuel of the Future: Data Is Giving Rise to a New Economy,
ECONOMIST (May 6, 2017), https://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21721634-how-itshaping-up-data-giving-rise-new-economy; Franklin Foer, How Silicon Valley Is Erasing
Your Individuality, WASH. POST (Sept. 8, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
outlook/how-silicon-valley-is-erasing-your-individuality/2017/09/08/a100010a-937c11e7-aace-04b862b2b3f3_story.html; Rana Foroohar, Big Tech’s Power Remains
Unchallenged, FIN. TIMES (Sept. 19, 2017), https://www.ft.com/video/19982ee4-04684efe-8e06-86057bb728e7.
INSIDEBIGDATA
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and scope of data (to train their digital assistant), as well as the products
necessary to attract new users and convince existing users to switch.253
Network effects are the second key element. As we saw, traditional
network effects help the leading platform attract more developers and
smart–technology manufacturers. Plus, the “learning–by–doing” and
“scope” network effects improve the quality of super–platform’s algorithm
in predicting users’ needs and tastes. Only a few companies in mid–2017
have the requisite volume and variety of personal data and opportunities to
experiment for their digital assistants to be competitive: Amazon,
Facebook, Google, and Apple.
The third key element is the scope of services the personal assistant can
offer, and the extent to which the digital assistant is integrated in these other
services. The European Commission’s recent decision in the
Microsoft/LinkedIn merger is instructive on how integration, at times, can
foreclose competition.254 Before the Commission approved the transaction,
it noted the possible adverse effects which could result from the integration
of LinkedIn’s features into the existing Microsoft platform.255 Such
integration would make the LinkedIn features “particularly prominent” to
Microsoft Outlook users and “likely enhance LinkedIn’s visibility to a very
large number of users” more so than when LinkedIn was a stand–alone
professional social network.256 This would increase the size of the
professional social network (and use of the network effects to Microsoft’s
advantage).257 Second, Microsoft could leverage its platform (such as
Outlook users’ address books) to suggest new LinkedIn connections and
thereby further significantly expand the size of its professional social
network.258 While LinkedIn would increase in size (and power), Microsoft
could hinder competing professional social networks by denying access to

253. Sofia Grafanaki, Autonomy Challenges in the Age of Big Data, 27 FORDHAM
INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 803, 841 (2017) (noting how the winner in the race
among digital assistants “will most likely depend on which company can create the most
seamless experience across devices and platforms. In other words, the key is the
aggregation of personal information.”).
254. See, e.g., Microsoft/LinkedIn Decision, supra note 22, ¶ 330 (noting how
integrating LinkedIn features into Microsoft Office, while denying competing professional
social network service providers access to Microsoft APIs may foreclose competing
providers).
255. Press Release, supra note 235.
256. See, e.g., Microsoft/LinkedIn Decision, supra note 22, ¶ 328.
257. Id. ¶ 324.
258. Id. ¶ 328.

1290

BERKELEY TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 32:1239

its Outlook API (and potentially other Microsoft APIs).259 If Microsoft did
so, “such providers would likely have no counterstrategy at their disposal
to sufficiently counter the merged entity's actions.”260 As a result, such
integration would likely increase the LinkedIn platform’s size and usage in
a way that rivals could not match.261 Due to the network effects, LinkedIn
would continue growing toward dominance, and competing professional
social network providers would be unable to compete effectively.262
The Commission’s concern in Microsoft/LinkedIn was the emergence
of a durable monopoly and its concomitant effects.263 Likewise, the super–
platform can nudge users to its digital assistant by seamlessly integrating its
digital assistant with its wide offering. Google, for example, announced in
2017 that it was incorporating artificial intelligence into its Gmail service—
which is used by over a billion people—“for features such as suggesting
responses to messages.”264 Google, as the chief digital assistant, can analyze
our emails, texts, or photos, and suggest replies.265 Google argues that
given:
its 17 years of work cataloguing the internet and physical world,
its assistant is smarter and better able to work with its email,
messaging, mapping and photo apps. And since Google makes
software for smartphones, smartwatches and old-fashioned
computers, Google says people will be able to have one
conversation with multiple machines.266

A standalone virtuous assistant would be at a disadvantage. As Google
told developers in 2017, its Android mobile operating system is used on
over two billion active devices worldwide; its Google Play online store,
Google Maps, Gmail, Chrome operating system and search app all have
over one billion monthly users.267 Developing a platform of similar scale

259. Id. ¶ 329.
260. See, e.g., id.
261. Id. ¶ 330.
262. Id. ¶ 343.
263. Id. ¶ 348.
264. Google Assistant Coming to iPhones; Will Take on Siri, WION (May 18, 2017,
1:11 PM), https://www.wionews.com/science-tech/google-assistant-coming-to-iphoneswill-take-on-siri-15719.
265. Yadron, supra note 10.
266. Id.
267. Reinhardt Krause, Google Trumpets Platform User Base vs. Apple, Facebook,
Amazon, INV. BUS. DAILY (May 18, 2017), http://www.investors.com/news/technology/
google-trumpets-platform-user-base-vs-apple-facebook-amazon/.
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and scope from scratch would likely be too costly and time consuming for
a competitor. For example, Microsoft spent over “$4.5 billion into
developing its algorithms and building the physical capacity necessary to
operate” its search engine Bing.268 Thus, a standalone virtuous assistant
would likely need to access and function well with the super–platform’s
services.
Super–platforms have already taken steps in order to consolidate market
power. Amazon in 2017, for example, partnered with Microsoft so that its
digital assistant will get better functionality via Cortana by accessing
Microsoft users’ work calendars and emails.269 Before then “Amazon,
Microsoft, Apple, and Google ha[d] all built rival digital assistants that have
been seen as walled gardens blocked off from each other, and this
partnership signals a move to make them work better together.”270
While Amazon and Microsoft might agree to partner with each other,
and while Apple might be willing to have Google’s digital assistant operate
on its iPhone,271 a dominant super–platform may not allow a nascent
virtuous assistant to access its platform and users.272 It could deny access to
the Google Play online store and Apple’s App Store.273 It could restrict
access to its user’s calendar, email, or texting app. It could give preferential
268. FED. TRADE COMM’N, MEMORANDUM RE: GOOGLE INC FILE NO. 111-0163 at 76
(2012), http://graphics.wsj.com/google-ftc-report (hosting the inadvertently–leaked
report).
269. Tom Warren, Microsoft and Amazon Partner to Integrate Alexa and Cortana
Digital Assistants, VERGE (Aug. 30, 2017, 4:11 AM), https://www.theverge.com/
2017/8/30/16224876/microsoft-amazon-cortana-alexa-partnership.
270. Id.
271. Reinhardt Krause, Siri, What’s Coming to Apple iPhones? Google’s Digital
Assistant, INV. BUS. DAILY (May 16, 2017), http://www.investors.com/news/technology/
siri-whats-coming-to-apple-iphones-googles-ai-digital-assistant/.
272. See, e.g., Grafanaki, supra note 253, at 841:
Because users pay companies like Google with their attention and their
data, which the companies then convert to advertising revenue, Google's
incentive is to keep users “locked-in” to its services in order to keep
collecting information, even if competitors may offer better products.
Such efforts are also present in Google's new product development in an
attempt to harness the momentum that is moving away from desktop
search and direct it to other products that the company can use as
platforms for its advertising business. This would seem like a simple rule
of business, but for the fact that Google is also the way that users find
potentially competing products, raising concerns about some of its
practices.
273. See EZRACHI & STUCKE, supra note 2, at 184–86 (discussing Disconnect being
kick out of Google Play Store).
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treatment to its own digital assistant, by pre–loading it on its smartphone,
having it on the smartphone’s opening screen, or integrating it into its other
popular products, including its search engine and the operating system.274 It
may exclude the virtuous assistant from its online wallet, such as Apple Pay
or Google Wallet.275 It could degrade the virtuous assistant’s functionality
by having it run slower than the operating system’s digital assistant.276
Users would likely blame the virtuous assistant for its tardiness. Or the
super–platforms may simply block the virtuous assistant by arguing that
doing so protects its users. For example, the super–platform may argue that
privacy considerations restrict interoperability with the virtuous assistant.277
Consequently, at least three key elements—data, network effects, and
scope of platform’s services—increase the likely switching costs and
undermine a potential virtuous assistant’s success. Although these elements
favor the super–platform, a popular virtuous assistant remains possible.
Despite the possibility for such a virtuous assistant, we are rather
pessimistic. Perhaps the easiest way to explain our pessimism is to ask the
following: Which search engine did you use today (or this past week)? Did
you opt for one which does not harvest information and retains your
anonymity (such as DuckDuckGo) or for one which tracks your behavior to
better target you with personalized ads? Did you limit the ability of your
phone apps to access personal and geolocation information? Do you often
change the default option? When downloading an app or update, do you
read the terms and conditions? Even if you did, did you still accept the
terms—despite not certainly knowing who will access your data and what
they will do with it?
In sum, a virtuous assistant is possible. Its presence might possibly limit
the ability of the dominant digital assistant to abuse its power. But in reality,
the majority of users may lack the incentive to switch. They may find it
difficult to quantify cost and harm, and when faced with complex decision
making, they may opt for the default. To illustrate—despite the European
Commission’s record fine against Google and Google’s repeated privacy
274. See STUCKE & GRUNES, supra note 40, at 164–65, 295; Mark Gurman, 7 Ways
Google’s Digital Assistant is Hobbled on Apple's iPhone, AUSTRALIAN FIN. REV. (May 19,
2017, 10:18 AM), http://www.afr.com/technology/mobiles-and-tablets/apple/7-waysgoogles-digital-assistant-is-hobbled-on-apples-iphone-20170518-gw8cef.
275. See STUCKE & GRUNES, supra note 40, at 295–96.
276. See id. at 295.
277. See Janice M. Mueller, Patent Misuse Through the Capture of Industry Standards,
17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 623, 633 (2002) (describing the anticompetitive effects of
restricting digital assistant interoperability).
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violations,278 there has not been a mass exodus to rival search engines. Few
people use multiple search engines (even though it very easy to multi–
home).279 When the search engine yields results that are not directly
responsive to their query, most people attempt a different search query,
rather than a different search engine.280 If virtuous search engines, such as
DuckDuckGo, have not prevented the abuses of the dominant search engine,
we remain doubtful that a virtuous digital assistant (by DuckDuckGo or
others) will fare any better.281 If most users do not multi–home search
engines, it is less likely they will train new digital assistants. Consequently,
the combination of network effects, data, and the scope of the super–
platform’s services will likely lead one or two dominant digital assistants—
either belonging to Google, Apple, Facebook, or Amazon.
V.

POSSIBLE INTERVENTION

Though this Article focuses heavily on competition, the problems we
identify reach beyond antitrust and so do the possible solutions. As any
solution will depend on which digital assistants become dominant, their
abuses, and the state of antitrust and privacy law and enforcement. When
considering possible solutions, however, one can divide the solutions into
two groups: First, a case–specific ex–post approach, which is reactive by
nature. Second, an ex–ante approach, which focuses on changes to the
regulatory or market framework. This Part briefly explore these two
approaches.
To begin, an ex–post approach may lead to intervention when the
platform operating the digital assistant holds a dominant position and abuses
it. To establish dominance, market power must be sustained over time. It is
important to stress that any form of ex–post intervention will have to be
carefully measured to avoid chilling innovation and investment.
Interventions will have to balance the benefits which flow from advanced
technology and artificial intelligence against the welfare risks identified
above.

278. See STUCKE & GRUNES, supra note 40, at 61–65.
279. Ezrachi & Stucke, supra note 120, at 490 n.37.
280. Amy Gesenhues, Study: Top Reason a User Would Block a Site from a Search?
Too Many Ads, SEARCH ENGINE LAND (Apr. 15, 2013, 1:42 PM),
http://searchengineland.com/?p=155708.
281. For a review of the possible ways in which algorithms could promote customer
welfare, see Michal S. Gal & Niva Elkin-Koren, Algorithmic Consumers, 30 HARV. J.L. &
TECH. 309 (2017).
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There are several difficulties with applying an ex–post approach to
evaluate abuses by digital assistants. Regulators will have to evaluate
whether the incumbent can operate independent of competitors and
consumers; whether network effects and switching costs shield it from
competitive pressure and establish dominance; and if dominance has been
established, whether that position of dominance has been abused.
One noteworthy challenge concerns the dynamic of competition in
markets in which services are offered for “free.” Competition officials often
adopt a price–centric approach to assess market power, namely whether the
firm can charge supracompetitive prices. Rarely do they assess market
power primarily in the form of non–price effects such as quality.282 Another
challenge concerns the weight regulators should attribute to disruptive
innovation, which may suffice to ensure that the incumbents refrain from
abusing their gatekeeper position.
Abuse may be established when the dominant undertaking engages in
exclusionary, predatory or, in the EU, exploitative conduct.283 Such
strategies have attracted the European Commission’s scrutiny in the past in
the area of operating systems and search engines. In Microsoft,284 the
Commission was concerned with the leveraging of market power from the
operating systems when Microsoft bundled Windows Media Player285 and
restricted interoperability with a view towards encouraging use of only
Windows PCs with Microsoft group servers, thus discouraging investment

282. See generally STUCKE & GRUNES, supra note 40, at 107–26 (exploring non–price
forms of market power in greater detail); Ariel Ezrachi & Maurice E. Stucke, The Curious
Case of Competition and Quality, 3 J. ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT 227 (2015).
283. See, e.g., United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570–71 (1966) (holding
that the offense of monopolization under Section 2 of the Sherman Act requires proof of
“(1) the possession of monopoly power in the relevant market and (2) the willful
acquisition or maintenance of that power as distinguished from growth or development as
a consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or historic accident”); J. Thomas
Rosch, Comm’r, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Wading Into Pandora’s Box: Thoughts On
Unanswered Questions Concerning The Scope And Application Of Section 2 & Some
Further Observations On Section 5, Remarks at the LECG Newport Summit on Antitrust
Law & Economics 1 (Oct. 3, 2009), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/
public_statements/wading-pandoras-box-thoughts-unanswered-questions-concerningscope-and-application-section-2-some/091003roschlecgspeech.pdf.
284. Commission Decision, Case 37.792—Microsoft, C(2004) 900; Case T-201/04,
Microsoft Corp. v. Comm’n, 2007 E.C.R. II-3601 (rejecting Microsoft’s appeal of the
commission’s decision).
285. Commission Decision, Case 37.792—Microsoft, C(2004) 900, ¶ 826–34;
Microsoft, 2007 E.C.R. II-3601 ¶ 856.
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in non–Microsoft group servers.286 Relatedly, in its Google investigation,
the Commission raised concerns as to search degradation by Google and
possible leveraging of market power.287 In the case of digital helpers, of
concern may be the super–platform’s ability to favor its own services
downstream and push out “as efficient” service providers (exclusionary
abuse), or the ability to engage in price discrimination and extracting
welfare from users (exploitative abuse). Intervention in such cases will
bring the abuse to an end, and may include measure aimed at insuring access
to the interface and better interoperability of platforms. At the extreme,
when faced with a dominant platform which downgrades interoperability of
others, one could consider forced access to the dominant firm’s APIs.288
But the ex post approach has its shortcomings. First the agencies and
courts may question the market power of digital assistants and their ability
to behave independently of others.
Even if customers are locked in, one may have difficulties establishing
some forms of abuse. The personalization of the service may make it
difficult to ascertain an objective benchmark for comparison. For example,
the European Commission alleged that Google favored its own comparison
shopping service over those of competitors; users—to their detriment—did
“not necessarily see the most relevant results in response to queries.”289
Inherent in this observation are several assumptions: (i) Google’s organic
or natural algorithm ordinarily provides objective results that most people
would find relevant, (ii) Google manipulated the rankings of its organic
search engine to systematically position and prominently display its
comparison shopping service in its general search results pages, irrespective
of its merits, and (iii) a remedy exists, namely enabling the organic
algorithm—without interference—to treat Google’s own comparison
286. Commission Decision, Case 37.792—Microsoft, C(2004) 900, ¶ 642–46;
Microsoft, 2007 E.C.R. II-3601 ¶ 651.
287. Press Release, supra note 40.
288. For illustration, consider the theory of harm and remedy in Case T-201/04,
Microsoft Corp. v. Comm’n, 2007 E.C.R. II-3601, where Microsoft was found to infringe
Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union because it refused to
supply interoperability information to its competitors. See also Case C-418/01, IMS Health
GmbH & Co. OHG v. NDC Health GmbH & Co. KG, 2004 E.C.R. I-5039; EUROPEAN
COMM’N STRATEGY CENT., ENTER THE DATA ECONOMY (2017), https://ec.europa.eu/epsc/
sites/epsc/files/strategic_note_issue_21.pdf.
289. Press Release, European Comm’n, Antitrust: Commission Takes Further Steps in
Investigations Alleging Google’s Comparison Shopping and Advertising-Related Practices
Breach EU Rules (July 14, 2016), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-162532_en.htm.
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shopping service and those of rivals in the same way (namely no bias in
favor of Google). Thus, the Commission could prove Google’s intentional
degradation with a ready counterfactual, namely what Google’s own
“organic” algorithm would have ranked as relevant, absent the
manipulation.
But for a personalized search engine, tailored to each individual’s
particular tastes, credible counterfactuals to quality degradation may be
difficult to establish. There may not be an organic algorithm. Nor is there
an objective baseline for “Alexa, what’s the latest on Donald Trump?” If
Alexa provides a Washington Post story (which Amazon’s CEO owns), it
may be difficult to assess whether this is evidence of quality degradation.
What interests conservatives may not interest liberals.290 Even if the topic
is of interest, the user might desire a particular viewpoint.291 Thus, it will
likely be harder to prove search degradation for a personalized digital
assistant than for a general search engine.292 As the primary interaction
takes place at the personal–assistant level, the effects may be seen more as
personalization (and thus a legitimate part of technological progress) than
exclusionary.
Third is the political will to challenge monopolization cases. In contrast
to the European Commission, the U.S. Department of Justice and Federal
Trade Commission have not meaningfully prosecuted monopolistic abuses
over the past few decades. The DOJ criminally prosecuted more persons in
one year under the Migratory Bird Treaty Act (227 in 2012) than it has
civilly and criminally prosecuted monopolies over the past 35 years (13
since 1980).293 Between 2007 and 2016, the DOJ opened seventeen
monopolization investigations, and brought only one case (in 2011).294
Beyond the traditional ex-post application of antitrust law, one may
identify a range of instruments which could be used, ex ante, to support
consumer welfare. Ex ante measures—implemented through sector
investigations, agreed commitments, regulatory instruments. or consumer
protection laws—may be used to require compliance with preconditions to
promote privacy competition, ensure that the platform’s incentives are
aligned with users’ interests, and prevent some of the market dynamics
which could give rise to exclusionary or exploitative effects.

290. See Bakshy et al., supra note 149, at 1130–31.
291. See id.
292. ECONOMIST, supra note 117.
293. STUCKE & GRUNES, supra note 40, at 300.
294. Id.; DEPT. OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST DIVISION WORKLOAD STATISTICS FY 2007–
2016 at 1, 5 (2017), https://www.justice.gov/atr/division-operations.
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For instance, basic measures would ensure that users retain autonomy,
are made aware of outside options and can switch with limited or no costs.
One could require digital assistants to indicate clearly, either in a pop–up
window or voice warning when their suggestions are “sponsored” or when
they offer service through their own platform network while excluding
others. Users may be able to opt out of personalized ads or sponsored
products.295 All these measures, to be effective, require short and clear
communications. Often the consent in today’s click–wrap is little more than
a façade.296 Knowing and voluntary consent is key. When users have few,
if any, viable options, consent is not real but forced.297 In addition, “consent
fatigue” or digital helpers managing consent forms on their users’ behalf,
could lead to meaningless agreement and undermine customer
empowerment.298
To allow switching between digital assistants, regulators and
policymakers should encourage data mobility. One proposal in Europe is a
“Personal Information Management System,” which collects and stores the
user’s data:
With PIMS, users would have a personal digital deck where all
their information is stored. Services (such as Facebook) would
then run on this deck, giving users the ability to keep track and
control the information they share and, above all, easily use that
information for multiple platforms. Hence, PIMS have the
potential to significantly increase transparency and portability of
data and, therefore stimulate data service competition.299

With adequate safeguards one should be able to transfer the core
parameters, which will enable a new digital assistant to start from a position
of personalization. At the providers’ side, mobility would require access to
platforms and the provision of interoperability information. Mobility may
require the development of basic industry standards for key data points and
will need to take into account issues of licensing and IP rights. Their
development should nonetheless allow sufficient freedom for developers, to
enable disruptive innovation.
295. Transparency is key—for example, in a 2017 update, Google allowed users to opt
out of personalized ads. Ryan Whitwam, How to Disable Personalized Ads on Android,
FORBES (Mar. 31, 2017, 11:56 AM) https://www.forbes.com/sites/ryanwhitwam/2017/03/
31/how-to-disable-personalized-ads-on-android/. This is a positive move, which ensures
user control over his or her data and search environment.
296. STUCKE & GRUNES, supra note 40, at ch. 21.
297. Id. at 58–66.
298. EZRACHI & STUCKE, supra note 2, at 226.
299. Id. at 12.
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CONCLUSION

In industries dominated with data–driven network effects, consumers
will likely receive free digital assistants. These assistants will excel at
mundane tasks—and as AI develops—they will increasingly assist users
with their daily tasks. Seeing the salient, day–to–day benefits, users may
trust and rely on their digital assistant. The assistant will no longer be simply
making French press coffee and turning on the lights in the kids’ rooms. It
will be tutoring children, entertaining families, telling happy or sad stories
from around the world, ordering food (and the books that it recommends),
and summoning the driverless car to whisk people to work.
As consumers welcome digital assistants into their homes, they may not
recognize their toll on our well–being. It is often hard to quantify long–term
costs and balance these against short–term gains. Digital assistants may be
helpful, no doubt. As the digital assistant increasingly controls mundane
household tasks, like regulating room temperature and playing music, it will
be harder to turn off. It will also be tempting to increasingly rely on the
digital assistant for other activities, such as receiving news, selecting shows
to watch, and identifying goods to buy. But consumers should be mindful
about the power they may have on data gathering and distribution and the
subsequent implications for privacy and our welfare.
Policymakers cannot assume that market forces will deliver the virtuous
assistant or curb the abuses described in this Article. Market forces, given
data–driven network effects, have the potential to increase entry barriers,
make the strong platforms (and their digital assistants) even stronger, and
weaken many independent digital assistants. These assistants would assist
in consolidating economic and political power into fewer hands. Market
forces, left unchecked, may yield a dominant and devious digital assistant
even though the technology exists for an independent virtuous assistant. The
large platform could extract even more personal data and command even
higher rents to allow other corporations to reach consumers. Not only will
consumer wallets be affected, but super–platforms could also manipulate
political and social discourse. These privacy, economic, and political
concerns will increase when the digital assistant is connected not only to
television sets, but computers, smart appliances, security cameras,
smartphones, and smart cars.
In sum, while it is easier to see the immediate benefits from these digital
assistants, understanding the long–term risks—while harder to see—is key.
No one likes a snooping digital assistant, especially one that profits at the
expense of innocent consumers. As this Article has described, super–
platforms and their digital assistants present unique challenges. Regulators
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and legislators must take steps to minimize the risks and protect consumers
interests and freedom. This is not a campaign against innovation, nor is it a
call for unconstrained state intervention. Rather, we should ask for a
balanced policy—one which promotes competition and innovation and
most importantly, social welfare. In a nutshell, the goals for a data–driven
economy should be an economy that’s inclusive, protects the privacy
interests of its citizens, promotes the citizenry’s overall wellbeing, and also
promotes a healthy democracy.

1300

BERKELEY TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 32:1239

